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American Indian Tribes, Race, 
and the Constitutional Minimum 
Sarah Krakoff* 
Abstract. In American law, Native nations (denominated in the Constitution and 
elsewhere as “tribes”) are sovereigns with a direct relationship with the federal 
government. Tribes’ governmental status situates them differently from other minority 
groups for many legal purposes, including equal protection analysis. Under current equal 
protection doctrine, classifications that further the federal government’s unique 
relationship with tribes and their members are subject to rationality review. Yet this 
deferential approach has recently been subject to criticism and is currently being 
challenged in the courts. Swept up in the larger drift toward colorblind or race-neutral 
understandings of the Constitution, advocates and commentators are questioning the 
distinction between tribes’ political and racial statuses and are calling for the invalidation 
of child welfare and gaming laws that further tribes’ unique sovereign status. 
The parties urging strict scrutiny of laws that benefit tribes contend that tribal 
membership rules, which often include elements of lineage or ancestry, are the same as 
racial classifications. In their view, tribes are therefore nothing other than collections of 
people connected by race. Yet federal law requires tribes (as collectives) to trace their 
heritage to peoples who preceded European/American settlement in order to establish a 
political relationship with the federal government. Descent and ancestry (not the 
sociolegal category of “race”) make the difference between legitimate federal recognition of 
tribal status and unauthorized, unconstitutional acts by Congress. Congress, in other 
words, cannot establish a government-to-government relationship with just any group of 
people. Tribes are treated differently from other groups due to their ties to the indigenous 
peoples of North America. These ties comprise a constitutional minimum requirement for 
federal tribal recognition. This constitutional understanding of tribes derives from the 
international law origins of the federal-tribal relationship and is reflected in 
contemporary case law and federal regulations. 
 
* Raphael J. Moses Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Thank you to Greg 
Ablavksy, Kristen Carpenter, Michael Dorf, Angela Riley, Pierre Schlag, Anna Spain, 
Gerald Torres, and colleagues at the University of Colorado works-in-progress workshop 
and Cornell Law School symposium series for invaluable feedback. I am also indebted to 
Melissa Austin, Emily Lubarsky, Andy Ball, and Jesse Heibel for their good cheer and 
excellent research assistance. 
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The argument advanced in this Article might be seen as a form of American Indian law 
exceptionalism. Yet it is consistent with racial formation theory’s project of understanding 
race as a construction that serves, creates, and perpetuates legalized subordination and 
shapes daily social conceptions and interactions. Racial formation theory calls for multiple 
accounts of racialization depending on the social and economic purposes served by each 
group’s subordination. On the remedial side, racial formation theory therefore necessarily 
anticipates what we might think of as multiple exceptionalisms. Put more simply, racism 
takes different forms for each group to which inferior characteristics have been ascribed. 
Undoing the effects of racism therefore requires customization. Reversing policies that 
aimed to eliminate Native people, and the racialized understanding of Indians that drove 
those policies, requires maintaining the political status of tribes as separate sovereigns, not 
destroying it in the name of an ahistorical conception of “race” neutrality. This Article 
untangles the legitimate constitutional basis for tribal recognition—that tribes can trace 
their ancestry to a time before nonindigenous arrival—from the racial logic that nearly 
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Introduction 
Should children who are eligible for membership in an American Indian 
tribe be treated differently from other children for purposes of foster care and 
adoption?1 Can states treat American Indian tribes differently from non-Indian 
companies under state gaming laws?2 As of today, the law’s answer to these and 
similar questions is yes. In American law, Native nations are sovereigns with a 
direct relationship with the federal government.3 Native nations’ governmen-
tal status situates them differently from other minority groups for many legal 
purposes, including equal protection analysis. Under current equal protection 
doctrine, classifications that further the federal government’s unique 
relationship with American Indians are not subject to heightened scrutiny.4 
The Supreme Court held in Morton v. Mancari that such classifications are 
political distinctions rather than acts of “invidious racial discrimination”5 and 
therefore are not subject to the Court’s most exacting review.6 As noted in 
Mancari, tribes’ distinctive status has been recognized since the Founding and is 
reflected in hundreds of treaties, statutes, and regulations that support tribal 
rights to self-determination.7 “If these laws . . . were deemed invidious racial 
discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code . . . would be 
effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the 
Indians would be jeopardized.”8 
 
 1. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (noting equal protection 
“concerns” but ruling on other grounds); Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for 
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 21-22, 24, Carter ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-
cv-01259-DKD (D. Ariz. July 6, 2015) (challenging the Indian Child Welfare Act on 
equal protection grounds). 
 2. See KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2012) (considering a non-
Indian development company’s challenge to a state law that gave priority to eligible 
American Indian tribes). 
 3. I use the terms “American Indian tribe” and “Native nation” interchangeably in this 
Article. “Native nation” is the preferred contemporary term for indigenous political 
sovereigns, but “American Indian tribe” is firmly ensconced in legal documents and 
vocabulary. 
 4. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
 5. Id. at 551. 
 6. Id. at 553-54. 
 7. Id. at 552-53; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political 
Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 164-72 (2008) (describing the historical 
understanding and treatment of tribes). 
 8. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
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Yet the Court’s deferential approach to classifications that affect tribes and 
their members has come under attack.9 Swept up in the larger drift toward 
colorblind or race-neutral understandings of the Constitution, courts and some 
commentators question the distinction between tribes’ political and racial 
statuses.10 They suggest that the Court’s rational basis approach to classifica-
tions concerning tribes and tribal members should be modified, if not 
altogether rejected.11 These arguments rely on what their proponents claim to 
be the race-based requirements (including lineal descent or “blood quantum”) 
for membership in many Native nations and therefore the “racial” status of 
tribes themselves.12 
One response to these arguments is historical, rooted in how tribes evolved 
from precontact13 peoples with their own definitions of membership to today’s 
“federally recognized tribes.” Since the arrival of Europeans, American Indian 
tribal formation has been a distinctly political process, one that also reflects the 
ways that U.S. laws and policies imposed racial characteristics on American 
Indian individuals and tribes.14 To the extent that tribes today have 
membership requirements that include lineage or blood quantum, they are part 
and parcel of that process of racial/political formation.15 The federal 
government catalogued tribes, defining them and imposing membership 
requirements at key historical moments, as part of a strategy of control and 
elimination.16 The process of bureaucratizing tribes and their members while 
simultaneously ascribing inferior characteristics to American Indians 
comprised a racializing project aimed at eventually defining Indians out of 
 
 9. See KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403-04 (D. Mass.) (criticizing 
Mancari), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). The 
Supreme Court has continued to affirm Mancari but has indirectly questioned aspects 
of its reasoning in two cases. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 
(2013); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000); see also infra notes 103-20 and 
accompanying text (discussing Adoptive Couple). 
 10. See infra Part I.A-B. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. I use “precontact” as shorthand for the political and legal status that indigenous peoples 
of North America possessed before the arrival of Europeans or—in cases where 
sustained contact did not occur until after the American Revolution—before the arrival 
of American settlers. 
 14. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 164-69; Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, 
Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2012). 
 15. See Sarah Krakoff, Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race, 9 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 
295, 296 (2014). 
 16. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1060-83 (recounting the historical evolution of the federal 
government’s tribal recognition practices and definitions). 
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existence.17 That project took the form of violent removals and massacres as 
well as assimilationist strategies.18 As I have argued in previous articles, using 
equal protection doctrine to demand a highly formalized and acontextual race 
neutrality with respect to tribes and their members today would, ironically, 
perpetuate the settler/colonial project of elimination.19 Used in this way, 
colorblindness could threaten tribes’ separate political status just as they are 
beginning to break free from the historical legacies of tribal racialization.20 
There is another complementary response that lies deep in the structure of 
tribes’ relationship with the federal government and is at the very heart of the 
federal power to recognize tribes as sovereigns. It is this: tribes (as collectives) 
must trace their heritage to peoples who preceded European/American 
settlement in order to establish a political relationship with the federal 
government. Tribes, in order to be recognized as such under the Constitution, 
therefore must, as an initial definitional matter, consist of people tied together 
by something akin to lineage. Descent and ancestry—distinct from but often 
conflated with the sociolegal category of “race”21—are the difference between 
 
 17. See id. at 1118-22; Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 387, 399-401 (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST (30th anniversary ed. 2001) (describing the violent displacement of 
Native peoples in the American West from 1860 to 1890); ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, 
AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2014) (reviewing U.S. policies 
toward Native peoples from the Founding to the present). As one historian stated, 
describing removal policies specifically, “[t]he removal of American Indians from their 
lands east of the Mississippi River was an act of all-encompassing violence that did not 
take place in an abstract world of political debates and historical narratives.” JOHN P. 
BOWES, LAND TOO GOOD FOR INDIANS: NORTHERN INDIAN REMOVAL 4 (2016). 
 19. See Krakoff, supra note 15, at 325-26; Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1122-31. 
 20. See Krakoff, supra note 15, at 325-26; Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1122-31. 
 21. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race.”). 
Justice Kennedy made this statement in the context of striking down a state law that 
allowed only Native Hawaiians to vote for board members of a state agency that 
governed programs for Native Hawaiians. Id. at 498-99. Justice Kennedy is not wholly 
wrong in saying this; ancestry certainly can be a proxy for racial discrimination in that 
it can be used in an attempt to disguise the continuation of racially discriminatory 
policies. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (striking down a 
literacy requirement for voting that exempted the descendants of those eligible to vote 
prior to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, effectively exempting whites). But 
as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Rice, ancestry is not necessarily a proxy for 
race, and context and history make all the difference. Rice, 528 U.S. at 544-45 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (concluding that the ancestry requirement was not a proxy for racial 
discrimination but rather a recognition of Native Hawaiians’ distinct claims to 
compensation and self-determination); see also Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1390-93 (2002) (arguing that tribes’ descent-based membership 
criteria serve the functions of political and cultural survival and should not be equated 
with illegitimate racial distinctions). Equating ancestry with race also belies the many 
ways in which laws recognize and honor ancestry outside of the Indian law context. 
footnote continued on next page 
They Were Here First 
69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017) 
497 
legitimate federal recognition of tribal status and unauthorized, unconstitu-
tional acts by Congress. In other words, Congress cannot establish a 
government-to-government relationship with just any group of people. When 
nonindigenous groups of people attempt to form a government within the 
United States, their options are extremely limited, to say the least.22 Tribes are 
treated differently from other groups due to their ties to the indigenous 
peoples of North America. Those ties therefore comprise a constitutional 
minimum for federal recognition. The federal courts should not use that 
constitutional distinction against tribes today in a misguided pursuit of 
colorblind constitutionalism. That is, at least, the argument in this Article, 
which will proceed as follows. 
Part I reviews contemporary equal protection cases as applied to Indians, 
focusing on challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)23 and tribal 
gaming. These cases either question whether tribal classifications are political 
rather than racial or argue for a tiered approach to scrutinizing classifications 
that affect tribes and tribal members. The parties opposing tribes’ distinctive 
treatment urge the courts to adopt a reverse discrimination paradigm, 
subjecting all classifications (regardless of intent, history, or connections to 
animus or subordination) to heightened judicial scrutiny. 
Part II addresses the constitutional basis for tribal political recognition and 
discusses definitions of Indian tribes from the time of the Founding through 
today. The Constitution’s structure and text, including the Indian Commerce 
Clause and the Treaty Clause, provide the federal government with the 
authority to enter into political and legal relationships with tribes.24 No other 
 
The laws of intestate succession in most states, for example, rely on ancestry. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2103 (2016); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402 (West 2016); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 700.2103 (2016); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2103 (2016) (all requiring decedents’ 
property to pass based on lineage in the absence of a surviving spouse); see also UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) 
(doing the same). U.S. citizenship laws also recognize ancestry. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 322.2 
(2016) (allowing a child to be eligible for citizenship if he or she has at least one U.S.-
citizen parent). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to create new states but 
prohibiting the creation of a new state by partitioning or joining existing states 
without the affected states’ and Congress’s consent). Outside of Article IV, there are no 
constitutionally recognized avenues for non-Indian citizens to band together to form a 
new internal government with a direct relationship with the U.S. federal government. 
 23. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2015)). 
 24. The Indian Commerce Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Treaty Clause 
authorizes the executive’s power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Treaty Clause does not mention Indian tribes 
specifically, but there is no dispute that the power includes treatymaking with tribes. 
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01[2], at 386 (Nell Jessup Newton 
footnote continued on next page 
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nonstate entity has a similar constitutional relationship with the federal 
government.25 Despite the longstanding nature of tribes’ distinct legal and 
political status, there was very little discussion of how tribes should be defined 
at the time of the Founding and for many decades thereafter.26 Yet it is clear 
from the historical context as well as international law doctrines (from which 
federal Indian law derived) that tribes’ singular constitutional status stemmed 
from their precontact existence as free and independent peoples indigenous to 
the continent.27 
Definitions later supplied by federal courts and federal agencies affirm this, 
either assuming or requiring ties to precontact peoples in order for tribes to be 
recognized by the federal government.28 More recently, definitions of 
indigenous peoples under international law, while careful to emphasize the 
importance of self-definition, likewise assume precolonial presence and ties to 
the land. These contemporary international legal definitions are not binding 
on U.S. law. But the initial principles for treating American Indians distinctly 
under the Constitution were drawn from the early law of nations. Contempo-
rary international law thus offers a fitting interpretive approach, particularly 
given its recent embrace of the rights of indigenous peoples.29 In short, the 
 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“The treaty clause . . . has been a principal 
foundation for federal power in Indian affairs.”). Some courts and scholars have also 
suggested that there is an extratextual source of the federal government’s power to 
enter into political relationships with the sovereigns that predated it. See, e.g., Philip P. 
Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 52-73 (1996) (discussing 
cases that advert to an extraconstitutional source and theorizing that international law 
provided the basis for this approach). Similarly, Gregory Ablavsky has argued that the 
Founders and first few presidential administrations relied broadly on the Constitu-
tion’s structure and purpose—rather than taking a narrow clause-bound approach—to 
justify exclusive and broad (though not absolute) powers in Indian affairs. Gregory 
Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1017-21 (2015). 
 25. The legal status of U.S. territories is distinct from that of tribes and other entities, 
although one scholar has argued that aspects of the federal Indian law paradigm should 
be extended to indigenous peoples in U.S. territories. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood 
Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 
833-36 (2008). 
 26. See William T. Hagan, Full Blood, Mixed Blood, Generic, and Ersatz: The Problem of Indian 
Identity, 27 ARIZ. & WEST 309, 309-10 (1985); see also William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal 
Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal Concept, 
34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 352-53 (1990). A review of documents by the nation’s 
founders reveals significant discussion of tribes’ legal status and the power of the 
federal government versus that of states to regulate relationships with tribes but 
virtually no discussion of what tribes are or how they are defined. See 2 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 528-56 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
 29. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 165-66, 173-74, 193 (2005) 
footnote continued on next page 
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Constitution’s unique treatment of tribes assumes that they are successors to 
the peoples who occupied the continent before the arrival of European 
explorers and American settlers. The constitutional distinction between tribes 
and other groups rests on this historical connection and therefore inscribes 
ancestry into the definition of “American Indian tribe.” 
Part III situates American Indians’ constitutional status in the larger 
context of racial formation and American law. Shaken loose from the formalist 
grip of race neutrality and colorblindness, we might see that (contra Chief 
Justice Roberts) the only way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to be 
more discriminate in our understandings of race, its origins, and its 
meanings.30 This is as true for African Americans, Latinos, and other groups as 
it is for American Indians.31 
In the American Indian context, tribes’ legal status, while crucial to their 
survival as independent peoples, was also laced from the outset with racialized 
depictions. Tribes’ otherness (as “savage,” “uncivilized,” and so forth) justified 
the subordination of tribes and tribal interests to the settler society’s demands 
for land and resources.32 Examples throughout Indian law and policy abound.33 
 
(arguing that the human rights turn in contemporary international law should be 
deployed to redeem federal Indian law from its colonialist origins); Frickey, supra note 
24, at 74-75 (arguing that because international law justified the assertion of federal 
power over tribes, contemporary international law should inform rights-based limits 
on that power). 
 30. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) 
(plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”); see also Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 985-91, 1002 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s postracial view 
is belied by ongoing race-based discrimination and would further rather than reverse 
current racial inequality). 
 31. There is a rich sociolegal literature on racial formation and the political-social 
constructions of race on which this Article relies throughout. See, e.g., IAN HANEY 
LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, at xv-xvi (rev. & updated 
ed. 2006); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1994); WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 
211 n.70 (describing the book’s central thesis as being informed by Omi and Winant’s 
concept of racial formation); Laura E. Gómez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the 
Politics of Crime in Territorial New Mexico, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1395, 1405 (2002); Cheryl I. 
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714-16 (1993). 
 32. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF WESTERN 
CIVILIZATION 223-25 (2012). 
 33. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 29. Williams provides a comprehensive tour 
through almost all of American Indian law, describing how every policy period and 
major doctrinal innovation was informed by anti-Indian racism. See, e.g., id. at 39 (“An 
overtly racist, hostile, and violent language of Indian savagery can be found in the first 
official U.S. legal document . . . , the Declaration of Independence.”); id. at 69 (describing 
the “racist language of Indian savagery” in the Marshall trilogy); id. at 143 (describing 
the Rehnquist Court’s Indian law as including “judicially validated language of Indian 
racial inferiority”). 
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In Johnson v. M’Intosh, one of the foundational cases in federal Indian law, Chief 
Justice Marshall described tribes as “fierce savages” to rationalize federal 
control over tribal rights to convey property.34 In Ex parte Crow Dog, the Court 
affirmed tribal freedom from federal criminal laws but on the basis that Indians 
needed time to advance from their “condition of a savage tribe to that of a 
people who, through the discipline of labor . . . , it was hoped might become a 
self-supporting and self-governed society.”35 In the mid-nineteenth century, 
federal officials urged the adoption of oppressive reservation policies with the 
following justification: “Stolid and unyielding in his nature, and inveterately 
wedded to . . . savage habits, customs, and prejudices . . . , it is seldom the case 
that the full blood Indian of our hemisphere can . . . be brought farther within 
the pale of civilization than to adopt its vices . . . .”36 The goal of contemporary 
American Indian policy is, or should be, to preserve tribes’ hard-earned 
political independence while simultaneously reversing the discrimination 
embedded in Indian law’s past.37 Eroding tribes’ constitutional status in the 
name of a misguided effort to eradicate all things sounding in “race” would 
have the opposite effect. 
On the one hand, this argument can be seen as a form of American Indian 
law exceptionalism—the idea that general public law principles do not apply to 
federal Indian law.38 And yet it is wholly consistent with the larger project of 
understanding race as a construction that serves, creates, and perpetuates 
legalized subordination and shapes daily social conceptions and interactions.39 
Racial formation theory calls for multiple accounts of racialization depending 
on the social and economic purposes served by each group’s subordination.40 
On the remedial side, racial formation theory therefore necessarily anticipates 
what we might think of as multiple exceptionalisms.41 To put it simply, if race 
 
 34. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823). 
 35. 109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883). 
 36. W. MEDILL, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 1, at 
385 (1848). 
 37. For a similar argument, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains 
and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 334-35, 374-75 (2004). 
 38. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 431, 437-43 (2005). 
 39. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 31, at 4, 54-56; Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction 
of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
6 (1994) (advancing a “theory of race as a social complex of meanings we continually 
replicate in our daily lives”). 
 40. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 31, at 55-61; Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary 
Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 
1214-16 (1997). 
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is a construct that divides and subordinates (or privileges) different groups for 
different purposes, then remedies may also have to be distinct for each group. 
The law’s role may be less to impose an artificial uniformity on this remedial 
process than to work through how to create an equal society in light of historic 
and legally constructed racial identities.42 
This Article fits within that larger project by supporting the specific goal 
of stripping racial discrimination from federal Indian policy.43 Its novel 
contribution is to highlight that tribes’ constitutional status assumes ancestral 
ties to peoples who preceded European (and then American) arrival. Tribes’ 
connections to their predecessors on the continent are what make those tribes 
distinct, politically and legally, from other groups.44 Courts that equate that 
distinction with racial discrimination misread the Constitution and risk 
reinscribing the racially discriminatory policies that aimed to destroy tribes’ 
continued separate existence. 
I. American Indians and Equal Protection 
American Indians have a unique legal and political status in the United 
States. If they belong to one of the federally recognized tribes (of which there 
 
 41. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 31, at 55-61; see also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 31, at 78-81 
(describing the complex forces and multiple actors that contribute to the legal 
construction of race). 
 42. See Barnes et al., supra note 30, at 1002-04 (rejecting a postracialist approach to equal 
protection). The Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016), is an ambivalent endorsement of maintaining the equality-promoting 
aspects of race-consciousness. The Court upheld the university’s affirmative action 
plan, which included consideration of race as a subfactor in a holistic admissions 
process. Id. at 2207, 2214-15. Justice Kennedy authored the 4-3 decision, marking the 
first time he has endorsed a race-conscious approach to admissions. The case is a 
landmark in that it appears to put to rest the argument that educational institutions 
can never take race or ethnicity into account in order to achieve educational objectives. 
 43. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 29; Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American 
Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 593 (2009); Goldberg, supra note 21, at 1392-94; Addie C. 
Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 958, 969-74 (2011). 
 44. This Article does not address a related question: whether, once tribes are recognized as 
governments under the Constitution, they are required to maintain membership 
requirements based on ancestry or lineal descent. My own position is that the 
Constitution imposes no such requirement. After the initial point of origin, tribes, like 
other governments, should be free to define citizenship in ways consistent with their 
values as nations. For scholarly support for this position, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 12 (2012-2013). For 
more on tribal citizenship rules and the functions they serve, see Krakoff, supra note 
15, at 321-25. For a study of contemporary challenges in the context of tribal member-
ship decisions, see Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal 
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383 (2015). 
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are currently 56745), they are members of political sovereigns, have distinct 
rights, and are subject to different legislative and jurisdictional schemes than 
nonmembers.46 At the same time, whether tribal members or not, American 
Indians may be (and unfortunately often are) subject to discrimination on the 
basis of race or ethnicity.47 
To date, equal protection doctrine has (for the most part) treated these two 
forms of differential treatment of American Indians differently—and for good 
reason. The former—laws, treaties, regulations, and other forms of legal 
classification that treat tribes and individual Indians distinctly based on their 
political status—are part and parcel of tribes’ retained inherent sovereignty and 
their contemporary self-determination.48 As a result, courts uphold these 
classifications by asking only whether they further Congress’s unique 
relationship with tribes.49 The latter—acts that discriminate against American 
Indians (whether tribal members or not) on the basis of their race or 
ethnicity—are subjected to the highest level of scrutiny.50 Under strict 
scrutiny, courts require the government to show that it has a compelling 
interest in its use of the racial classification and that its means for achieving 
that interest are narrowly tailored.51 
The Supreme Court first articulated the deferential standard for classifica-
tions that further tribal interests—the first category discussed above—in 
Morton v. Mancari. In that case, the Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 
 45. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,826 (May 4, 2016). 
 46. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 1-2 (providing an overview of the many 
sources of law governing the tribal-federal relationship). 
 47. Recently, egregious acts of racism by non-Indians against Native Americans have 
included burning a Native homeless man, cursing and yelling “go back to the reserva-
tion” at Native American children, and other violence and abuse targeted at Native 
people. See, e.g., Simon Moya-Smith, Beer Poured on Students, Told to “Go Back to the 
Reservation” at Hockey Game, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://ictmn.com/Z6Hp; Sheena Louise Roetman, Couple Allegedly Set Homeless Native 
American Man on Fire, Police Say, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 30, 
2015), http://ictmn.com/4QeD. For a thorough account of egregious racism in a town 
bordering the Navajo Nation, see RODNEY BARKER, THE BROKEN CIRCLE: A TRUE STORY 
OF MURDER AND MAGIC IN INDIAN COUNTRY chs. 1-8 (1992). These types of racist acts 
are, in theory anyway, redressable under civil rights laws and, if perpetrated by state 
actors, subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 48. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 37, at 341-43. 
 49. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal 
Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2010). 
 50. See Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, 975 F.2d 741, 743-45 (10th Cir. 1992); Natonabah v. 
Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D.N.M. 1973); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24,  
§ 14.02[2][b], at 936-37. 
 51. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2210 (2016) (summarizing the 
test in the context of a challenge to a public university’s affirmative action program). 
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(BIA) employment preference for tribal members against a challenge by non-
Indians.52 The employment preference was first adopted in 1934 as part of the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which aimed to make the BIA more 
responsive to its constituents—American Indian tribes and tribal members.53 
The BIA largely ignored the IRA’s preference until tribal members sued the 
BIA in the 1970s, prompting the agency to adopt the following policy: “To be 
eligible for preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual 
must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a 
Federally-recognized tribe.”54 The Supreme Court in Mancari unanimously 
upheld this preference because it relied on a political distinction—membership 
in a federally recognized tribe—rather than a racial one: “The preference is not 
directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only 
to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many 
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the 
preference is political rather than racial in nature.”55 
As has been noted, the Court failed to grapple with the fact that the BIA 
supplemented the political membership criterion with a seemingly gratuitous 
blood quantum requirement, complicating the conclusion that the distinction 
was political and not “racial.”56 Other scholars have thoroughly examined the 
“racial versus political” dichotomy, largely concluding that Mancari’s doctrinal 
approach was the right one even if its explanation lacked nuance.57 Further, in 
the years since Mancari was decided, the federal government has all but 
eliminated supplemental blood quantum requirements from its criteria for 
federal Indian programs.58 Therefore, while Mancari’s “racial versus political” 
characterization glossed over uncomfortable aspects of the BIA rule, Mancari’s 
central point—that federal actions in furtherance of tribal self-governance 
should not be viewed in the same light as discriminatory racial classifications—
remains sensible. The leading Indian law treatise reconciles Mancari’s imprecise 
wording with its larger import by concluding: “A sound reading of Morton v. 
Mancari would acknowledge that even though ancestry may figure into some 
Indian classifications, ultimately the most important inquiry is whether the 
 
 52. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537, 555. 
 53. Id. at 542-43. 
 54. Id. at 553 n.24 (quoting 44 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 3.1, at 335 (1974)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1058. 
 57. See Berger, supra note 49, at 1187-88; Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1082; Rolnick, supra note 
43, at 969-74; see also Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 943, 973 (2002). 
 58. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1083-85. 
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law can be justified as fulfilling ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
Indians.’”59 
After rejecting the argument that the BIA preference was racial in nature, 
Mancari characterized the rule as “an employment criterion reasonably 
designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA 
more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups.”60 It then concluded 
that the preference was “reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, 
nonracially based goal.”61 The Court noted more broadly that American 
Indians’ unique legal and political status resulted in many laws and 
classifications that treat Indians differently from other groups or individuals, 
and it stated, “As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the 
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative 
judgments will not be disturbed.”62  
Not long after Mancari, however, the Supreme Court abandoned any effort 
to grapple with whether federal classifications affecting tribes or tribal 
members fulfilled “Congress’ unique obligations toward the Indians.”63 In 
United States v. Antelope,64 two Indian defendants challenged their prosecution 
under the Major Crimes Act (MCA)65 on equal protection grounds. The MCA 
subjects Indian defendants to federal prosecution for listed felonies occurring 
in Indian country and can result in treatment substantially different from what 
defendants would receive under state law.66 The Antelope defendants had been 
convicted of felony murder under the MCA, but the state in which the crime 
was allegedly committed had no felony murder provision.67 The Court rejected 
the Antelope defendants’ equal protection arguments, citing Mancari for the 
conclusion that the MCA’s distinctive treatment of Indian defendants was 
based on their political status as tribal members.68 As several scholars have 
noted, Antelope failed to engage the question how a federal jurisdictional scheme 
for prosecuting crimes by and against Native people fulfilled the government’s 
“unique” obligations to tribes.69 Instead, “the Court collapsed the [Mancari] 
 
 59. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 14.03[2][b], at 954 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). 
 60. 417 U.S. at 554. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 555. 
 63. Id.  
 64. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
 65. For the current version of the relevant provisions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2015). 
 66. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 644-45 (describing the differences between the state and federal 
laws applicable to the Antelope defendants). 
 67. Id. at 644. 
 68. Id. at 645-47.  
 69. See Berger, supra note 49, at 1187; Rolnick, supra note 43, at 993-94. 
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analysis into a simple one-line formula: if the distinction is based on tribes or 
tribal membership, it will be upheld.”70 
After Antelope, tribes and tribal members had little hope of using Mancari to 
challenge federal actions that harmed tribal interests. Courts were reluctant to 
plumb the distinction between federal classifications that furthered the 
political relationship with tribes and those that did not.71 Several commenta-
tors have critiqued the post-Mancari framework on this basis and proposed 
that courts could give Mancari’s test teeth without eroding its deference to laws 
that support tribes and their members.72 Other scholars have proposed that the 
Mancari approach should not be limited to federally recognized tribes but 
should also encompass the claims of other indigenous groups with valid 
arguments for distinctive treatment and self-determination.73 Native 
Hawaiians and American Samoans, for example, have property rights based on 
their indigenous status, but because they are not federally recognized Indian 
tribes, those rights might be vulnerable to equal protection challenges.74 
These are important contributions that highlight limitations within the 
Mancari framework, but they are not the main focus of this Article.75 Instead, 
the primary focus here is defending Mancari against the latest wave of attacks, 
which—similar to the claims in Mancari itself (and unlike Antelope and other 
cases that involve equal protection claims brought by American Indians76)—are 
in the nature of anti-affirmative action claims. These latest cases, discussed 
below, are brought either by non-Indians directly or by those representing the 
interests of non-Indians in the child welfare and adoption context. They aim to 
cast doubt on Mancari’s distinction between political and racial classifications. 
They therefore seek to recruit courts to second-guess federal and state 
classifications that promote or recognize tribes’ unique governmental status 
and powers as well as individual tribal members’ distinctive rights and 
interests. Like opponents of affirmative action programs, the parties 
 
 70. Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1059. 
 71. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 501-02 (1979); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85-90 (1977) (rejecting 
an equal protection challenge by a group of Delawares to a federal statute that had 
excluded them from an award from the Indian Claims Commission). 
 72. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1058-59; Rolnick, supra note 43, at 993. 
 73. See Villazor, supra note 25, at 819-24. 
 74. See id. 
 75. As I have discussed elsewhere, however, the formulaic application of the Mancari rule 
has also informed current efforts to revive judicial scrutiny in ways that would not 
further tribal interests. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1059 n.85, 1125-27.  
 76. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 642-44 (1977); see also United States v. 
Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 
1265 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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attempting to overthrow Mancari pursue a colorblind approach to the 
Constitution, an approach that would subject all racial classifications to strict 
scrutiny whether or not they have nondiscriminatory purposes.77 
A. Adoption and Foster Care 
Children who are tribal members, or who are eligible for membership in 
an Indian tribe, are treated differently from non-Indian children in the foster 
care and adoption context pursuant to a federal statute, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.78 Non-Indians who object to ICWA’s distinctive treatment of 
Indian children have brought a series of cases, discussed below, challenging 
ICWA on equal protection grounds.  
To understand the threat these cases pose to tribes and their members, it is 
necessary to review the context of ICWA’s passage. Congress passed ICWA in 
response to overwhelming evidence that “an alarmingly high percentage” of 
Indian children are removed from their families “by nontribal public and 
private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are 
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”79 In 
extensive hearings before Congress, tribal members and various experts 
testified about the discriminatory practices of state and private welfare and 
adoption agencies and state courts’ abuse of their authority.80 Before ICWA’s 
passage, courts and other state actors justified removing Indian children from 
their families based on uninformed judgments about Native family 
arrangements and living circumstances, as well as the notion that Indian 
children could be saved only by placement in non-Native homes.81 
“Congressional reports documented the ignorance and hostility of state social 
workers and judges toward tribal culture and its benefits . . . . [S]tates asserted 
exclusive jurisdiction and denied due process in state proceedings brought to 
remove Indian children from their families.”82 Similar to the infamous slogan 
associated with the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, “Kill the Indian, save the 
 
 77. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 1375 (criticizing challenges to Indian programs that use 
“racialization to trigger strict scrutiny under equal protection law and thereby to deny 
Indians the benefit of federal measures enacted to compensate for or reverse prior 
harms”). 
 78. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2015) (defining Indian children for the purposes of the Act). 
 79. Id. § 1901(4). 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8-9 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 11-13 (1977). 
 81. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8-12. 
 82. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 11.01[2], at 832. 
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man,” the pre-ICWA mantra might be summarized as “Extract the Indian to 
save the child.”83  
To stanch the exodus of Indian children from their communities, ICWA 
“constructs a statutory scheme to prevent states from improperly removing 
Indian children from their parents, extended families, and tribes.”84 ICWA’s 
provisions include exclusive jurisdiction for tribal courts in certain 
proceedings;85 tribal rights of intervention and transfer of jurisdiction in 
others;86 and heightened standards for the removal of Indian children, their 
foster care placement, and the termination of parental rights.87 ICWA also 
imposes preferences for adoptive and foster care placements of Indian children, 
prioritizing the child’s extended family, tribal members, and other tribal or 
Indian placements.88 
ICWA fits readily within Mancari’s rationale: ICWA’s “special treatment” 
of Indian children in the adoption and foster care context fulfills “Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians” and is therefore justifiable on equal 
 
 83. See Barbara Landis, Carlisle Indian Industrial School History, CARLISLE INDIAN INDUS. SCH., 
http://home.epix.net/~landis/histry.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). This quotation is 
attributed to the Carlisle School’s founder, Richard Henry Pratt. Pratt did not say 
precisely those words, but his mission in founding the school in 1879 was unabashedly 
assimilationist. Pratt, like many reformers of his era, believed that the only way to save 
Indians was to force them to adopt white ways. See generally Rennard Strickland, 
Friends and Enemies of the American Indian: An Essay Review on Native American Law and 
Public Policy, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313 (1975) (describing the assimilationist strategies of 
nineteenth-century reformers). Landis, a historian of the Carlisle School, quotes a letter 
by Pratt responding to a request for “Indian stories” that was the likely source of the 
quotation: 
The author of the letter evidently has the idea of Indians that Buffalo Bill and other showmen 
keep alive, by hiring the reservation wild man to dress in his most hideous costume of 
feathers, paint, moccasins, blanket, leggins, and scalp lock, and to display his savagery, by hair 
lifting war-whoops make those who pay to see him, think he is a blood-thirsty creature ready 
to devour people alive. It is this nature in our red brother that is better dead than alive, and 
when we agree with the oft-repeated sentiment that the only good Indian is a dead one, we 
mean this characteristic of the Indian. Carlisle’s mission is to kill THIS Indian, as we build up the 
better man. We give the rising Indian something nobler and higher to think about and do, and 
he comes out a young man with the ambitions and aspirations of his more favored white 
brother. We do not like to keep alive the stories of his past, hence deal more with his present 
and his future. 
  Landis, supra (emphasis added). 
 84. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 11.01[1], at 830. 
 85. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2015) (giving Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction over custody 
proceedings involving Indian children who reside on or are domiciled within the 
tribe’s reservation or who are already wards of the tribal court, regardless of residence 
or domicile). 
 86. Id. § 1911(b)-(c). 
 87. See id. § 1912(d)-(f). 
 88. Id. § 1915(a)-(b) (addressing placement preferences for adoptive and foster care, 
respectively). 
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protection grounds.89 Further, ICWA classifies children based on their 
affiliation with a federally recognized tribe, not their racial or ethnic identity. 
ICWA defines an Indian child as “any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an 
Indian tribe.”90 “Indian” is defined as “any person who is a member of an Indian 
tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation.”91 
ICWA therefore tracks Mancari’s distinction between people who may be 
“racially” Indian and those who are members of recognized tribes.92 Children 
who have Indian ancestry but are not eligible for membership in a federally 
recognized tribe are not subject to ICWA’s protections. 
Further, there is ample social science support for the conclusion that 
ICWA is indeed serving its congressional purpose, thus easily satisfying 
rational basis review under Mancari.93 Since ICWA’s passage, there have been 
several studies concerning its implementation and effectiveness. More 
comprehensive data would be ideal, but the assessments to date indicate that 
ICWA, when properly implemented, achieves its goals.94 Furthermore, some 
childcare professionals credit ICWA with creating a standard for best practices 
in all child welfare cases.95 Specifically, ICWA requires “active efforts” to 
 
 89. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
 90. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 91. Id. § 1903(3). 
 92. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
 93. See id. at 555. 
 94. See Gordon E. Limb et al., An Empirical Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act and 
Its Impact on Cultural and Familial Preservation for American Indian Children, 28 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1279, 1280-82 (2004) (concluding that ICWA compliance showed 
promise for implementation of key family preservation provisions); see also Ann E. 
MacEachron et al., The Effectiveness of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 70 SOC. SERV. 
REV. 451, 454-60 (1996) (showing decreases in state adoption rates and state foster care 
placement rates for American Indian children between 1975 and 1986). Most studies of 
ICWA, including a 2005 Government Accountability Office report, note that 
insufficient recordkeeping and data collection hamper assessments of ICWA compli-
ance and outcomes. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT: EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO 
TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES 4-5 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05290.pdf; MARGARET C. PLANTZ ET AL., CSR, INC. & THREE FEATHERS 
ASSOCS., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE: A STATUS REPORT 254 (1988), http://eric.ed.gov/
?id=ED302352. 
 95. See Limb et al., supra note 94, at 1280-81 (“ICWA is important because it not only 
clarifies jurisdictional authority, but it also mandates that ‘American Indian definitions 
of family be used as [a] guide for child welfare matters.’ Therefore, American Indians, 
through passage of ICWA, began setting the stage for an updated orientation toward 
family preservation in national child welfare matters.” (quoting JOHN G. RED HORSE ET 
AL., FAMILY PRESERVATION: CONCEPTS IN AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITIES 18 (2000), 
http://www.nicwa.org/research/01.FamilyPreservation.pdf)). 
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prevent the breakup of families, the provision of rehabilitative and remedial 
services, and placement of children with extended family.96 ICWA’s goal of 
ensuring that children are placed with their relatives rather than in foster care 
or institutions is, according to many schools of thought, the best approach for 
all children, not only American Indian children.97 
Today, however, ICWA has some powerful opposition. Parties and special 
interest groups that favor adoption are raising a number of challenges to 
ICWA and its state counterparts.98 In July 2015, for example, parties 
represented by the Goldwater Institute filed a class action lawsuit alleging that 
ICWA violates the equal protection and due process rights of Indian children 
in foster care.99 The named plaintiffs in that case include two very young 
children who are eligible for tribal membership, a non-Indian “next friend” 
who purports to represent the interests of the children, and two sets of non-
Indian foster parents.100 The complaint alleges that the named plaintiffs and all 
other similarly situated children are discriminated against on the basis of race 
(often equating ancestry with race) due to ICWA’s procedural and substantive 
requirements.101 The complaint acknowledges that ICWA applies only to 
children who are eligible for tribal membership but then asserts: “Most Indian 
tribes have only blood quantum or lineage requirements as prerequisites for 
membership,” and therefore “ICWA’s definition of ‘Indian child’ is based solely 
on the child’s race or ancestry.”102 This case is at an early stage, but it builds on 
a multiyear campaign of challenging ICWA as a race-based scheme that harms 
Indian children by making them ineligible for adoption by non-Indians.  
In the most high-profile case of this sort to date, Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, non-Indian adoptive parents argued that the application of ICWA to their 
 
 96. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). 
 97. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE, at v-x (2002) 
(documenting the destructive state role in removing children from African American 
families); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 672-
87 (2006) (discussing the benefits of a problem-solving approach to child welfare that 
incorporates the entire family). 
 98. See, e.g., Doe v. Piper, 165 F. Supp. 3d 789 (D. Minn. 2016) (challenging the notice and 
intervention provisions of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act); Nat’l 
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015) (challenging the 
BIA’s 2015 guidelines for implementing ICWA); Verified Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. Pruitt, No. 2015-cv-471-JED-FHM, 2015 WL 7259553 
(N.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2015) (challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the 
Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act).  
 99. Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, 21-
25, Carter ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259-DKD (D. Ariz. July 6, 2015). 
 100. Id. at 3-4.  
 101. Id. at 7-9, 21-23.  
 102. Id. at 9. 
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adoption raised serious equal protection concerns.103 That case, which 
garnered significant media coverage,104 involved a girl whose father was an 
enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and whose mother was 
non-Indian.105 The record, which was thoroughly reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina in its opinion affirming the application of ICWA, 
indicated that the birth mother placed the baby for adoption without properly 
notifying the Cherokee father or ultimately identifying him in the adoption 
papers.106 The baby was therefore delivered to the non-Indian adoptive couple 
shortly after her birth and taken to the couple’s home in South Carolina.107 
Although the adoptive parents filed for adoption in South Carolina when 
the baby was three days old, the Cherokee biological father was not served 
with notice until four months later, shortly before he was deployed to Iraq.108 
When the biological father was finally served, he signed the adoption papers 
before realizing that the baby had been placed with outsiders rather than her 
biological mother.109 He also testified that he immediately tried to get the 
papers back, but the process server “told me that I could not grab that [sic] 
because . . . I would be going to jail if I was to do any harm to the paper.”110 The 
biological father promptly consulted a lawyer and filed for a stay of the 
adoption proceedings the next week.111 This set in motion a contest for the 
 
 103. See Brief for Petitioners at 43-47, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) 
(No. 12-399); Brief for Guardian ad Litem, as Representative of Respondent Baby Girl, 
Supporting Reversal at 53-55, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399). 
 104. See, e.g., Megan Lindsey, What About Veronica?: A Look into Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, JURIST (May 6, 2013, 2:15 PM ET), http://www.jurist.org/sidebar/2013/05/
megan-lindsey-adoptive-couple.php; Bill Mears, Justices Rule for Adoptive Couple in 
Native-American Custody Dispute, CNN (June 26, 2013, 9:46 AM ET), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/25/politics/scotus-adoptive-parents; Josh Voorhees, 
The Long, Complicated “Baby Veronica” Saga Comes to an Unsatisfying End, SLATE (July 17, 
2013, 8:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/07/17/adoptive_
couple_vs_baby_girl_south_carolina_court_sends_baby_veronica_back.html. 
 105. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
 106. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553-54 (S.C. 2012) (recounting the 
actions by the birth mother and the adoptive parents’ lawyers that concealed the 
biological father’s status as a tribal member, as well as the biological father’s testimony 
that he would not have told the birth mother that he would relinquish his rights had he 
known she planned to give the baby up for adoption), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). For 
more detailed accounts of the facts of the case, see Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the 
Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 
296-300 (2015); and Krakoff, supra note 15, at 299-303. 
 107. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. 
 108. Id. at 555. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (alterations in original). 
 111. Id.  
They Were Here First 
69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017) 
511 
baby’s custody, which resulted in a South Carolina Supreme Court decision in 
favor of the biological father.112 At the age of two, the baby was placed with 
her biological father and returned to Oklahoma to be raised by her Cherokee 
family.113 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, precipitating the second highly publi-
cized custody change in the child’s short life. The Court ruled solely on 
statutory grounds, holding that three provisions of ICWA—25 U.S.C.  
§§ 1912(d), 1912(f), and 1915(a)—did not apply under the circumstances of the 
case.114 More relevant to this Article, however, are the Court’s few but telling 
words about identity and equal protection in Adoptive Couple. Justice Alito, who 
wrote the majority opinion, began by stating:  
This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because 
she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of [ICWA] required her to 
be taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only parents she had ever  
known . . . .115 
Later in the opinion, Justice Alito wrote: “It is undisputed that, had Baby 
Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to 
object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”116 And toward the end of the 
opinion, Justice Alito gave a nod to the adoptive parents’ equal protection 
argument: “[U]nder the State Supreme Court’s reading, [ICWA] would put 
certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—
even a remote one—was an Indian.”117 This, according to Justice Alito, “would 
raise equal protection concerns,” which were avoided by the Court’s narrow 
interpretation of the statute.118 
The constitutional concerns are presumably that ancestry results in 
distinctive treatment in the context of adoption and foster care. Yet the child’s 
ancestral tie to Cherokee people, which the Court apparently found 
troublingly slim, is what qualified her for membership in the tribe. The 
Cherokee Nation defines citizenship based on descent from historic 
 
 112. Id. at 555-56, 567.  
 113. See id. at 552, 556. 
 114. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013); see also Berger, supra  
note 106, at 297-98, 311-15, 318-19; Jessica Di Palma, Comment, Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl: The Supreme Court’s Distorted Interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 
1978, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 523, 534-36 (2014). But see Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572-86 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion’s approach to statutory 
interpretation). 
 115. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 2559. 
 117. Id. at 2565. 
 118. Id. 
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membership rolls.119 When Justice Alito wrote that Baby Veronica was 
“classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee,”120 he may just as 
well have written that she was “classified as an Indian because she was eligible 
for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.” All Justice Alito was 
doing, in essence, was repeating that Baby Veronica met the tribe’s 
requirements for political membership. 
Treating children differently based on their eligibility for tribal member-
ship is, of course, precisely what ICWA requires. As explained above, ICWA’s 
goals are to preserve American Indian tribes and families and protect Indian 
children. Meeting these goals necessarily entails defining who qualifies for 
protection under the Act. The definitions the Act provides, referenced above, 
track the political classification of Indians and Indian children by making 
membership, or eligibility for membership, in a federally recognized tribe the 
triggering criterion.121 ICWA, in other words, classifies children according to 
political membership rather than race, and it should be subject only to 
Mancari’s deferential standard of review. Even if the Court decided to revive 
the effort, abandoned since Antelope, to give meaning to the inquiry whether 
the federal classification actually furthered the “unique relationship” with 
Indians, ICWA would readily meet that test.122 ICWA was passed explicitly to 
protect tribal self-governance and culture against the discriminatory practices 
of state social service workers and state courts.123 For the Court to scrutinize 
ICWA’s application to particular cases or its workings as a whole, it would 
have to abandon Mancari’s deferential approach and adopt a higher standard of 
judicial review. 
Adoptive Couple was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to raise constitutional 
questions about ICWA, but it built on earlier state court challenges. Two 
California intermediate appellate courts have applied a judge-made exception 
to ICWA, known as the “existing Indian family doctrine,” on constitutional 
avoidance grounds.124 The doctrine empowers state courts to assess whether 
the Indian parent of an ICWA-eligible child has sufficient cultural or political 
connections to his or her tribe to warrant ICWA’s protections. It does not 
derive from any language in the Act itself and, as several commentators and 
 
 119. See Tribal Citizenship, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services/
TribalCitizenship.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). 
 120. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556 (emphasis added). 
 121. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)-(4) (2015); see also supra text accompanying notes 89-92. 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.  
 123. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)-(5); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 1-2, 9-11 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 
1-2, 9-13 (1977). 
 124. See In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 697, 716-23 (Ct. App. 2001); In re Bridget R., 49 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 515-16 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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courts have described, it licenses state judges to decide who is sufficiently 
Indian, directly contradicting the goals and purposes of ICWA.125 
In In re Bridget R., the first of the California cases, the parents surrendered 
twin girls for adoption shortly after their birth.126 The biological father was a 
member of the Dry Creek Rancheria of Pomo Indians. Under the advice of the 
lawyer arranging the adoption, the biological father changed his identification 
from one-quarter Indian to white on the relevant forms. A non-Indian couple 
from Ohio adopted the twins and took them to their new home state.127 In the 
meantime, the birth father, with the support of his family and tribe, sought to 
rescind his relinquishment of the twins.128 There was no question that ICWA 
had not been followed in the case. The court held, however, that applying the 
Act would be unconstitutional under the circumstances. The court concluded: 
It is almost too obvious to require articulation that “the unique values of Indian 
culture” (25 U.S.C. § 1902) will not be preserved in the homes of parents who have 
become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture. This being so, it is questionable 
whether a rational basis, far less a compelling need, exists for applying the 
requirements of the Act where fully assimilated Indian parents seek to voluntari-
ly relinquish children for adoption.129 
The second California case, In re Santos Y., involved ICWA’s placement 
preferences.130 The child—whose mother was an enrolled member of the 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe Grand Portage Band and whose father was of 
Navajo descent but was not registered with the Navajo Tribe—had been placed 
in foster care due to neglect when he was a few months old.131 After parental 
rights were terminated, the Grand Portage Band identified a relative who was 
willing to adopt the child. A foster family, who had by then taken care of 
Santos for two years, also wanted to adopt the child.132 State reports on both 
placements concluded that each family was well qualified to provide a suitable 
home for Santos, and the trial court ordered that Santos be placed with the 
Grand Portage family in compliance with ICWA’s placement preferences.133  
 
 125. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 551 (Kan. 2009) (rejecting the doctrine and overturning an 
earlier Kansas case that had adopted it); Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A 
Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 34-43 
(1998). 
 126. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. 
 127. Id. at 515, 518. 
 128. Id. at 518. 
 129. Id. at 526. 
 130. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 699 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 131. Id. at 697-98. 
 132. Id. at 702-07. 
 133. Id. at 706-12. 
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The appellate court reversed, stating that ICWA had to be analyzed under 
“strict scrutiny to determine whether, as applied, it serves a compelling 
government purpose and, if so, whether its application is actually necessary 
and effective to the accomplishment of that purpose.”134 The court did not 
“disagree . . . that preserving Native American culture is a significant, if not 
compelling, governmental interest.”135 It concluded, however, that the statute’s 
purpose was not met in that case because there was “no Indian family here to 
preserve.”136 Similar to Adoptive Couple, the concern in In re Santos Y. was that 
individual children were being sorted based on their ancestry and thus 
implicitly subjected to different treatment based solely on that ancestry.137 In re 
Santos Y. then makes the leap from ancestry to strict scrutiny for equal 
protection purposes without grappling with the fact that ancestry is the basis 
for political membership in a tribe.  
To date, only these two intermediate state courts have declined to apply 
ICWA on equal protection grounds.138 Courts in two other states, North 
Dakota and Oklahoma, have explicitly rejected such claims.139 The Supreme 
Court of North Dakota observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected claims that laws that treat Indians as a distinct class 
violate equal protection. The different treatment of Indians and non-Indians 
under ICWA is based on the political status of the parents and children and the 
quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe.”140 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
likewise held that there was no equal protection or other constitutional 
infirmity with ICWA.141  
In addition, the trend over the past decade has been that more state courts 
have declined to adopt the existing Indian family doctrine (which reflects the 
same concerns as the equal protection objections to ICWA without necessarily 
referring to the constitutional language) than have adopted it. Courts or 
 
 134. Id. at 725. 
 135. Id. at 726. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 726-31; see Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556, 2559, 2565 (2013). 
 138. Even within California, there is no consensus. See Adoption of Hannah S., 48 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 605, 609-11 (Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the existing Indian family doctrine and an 
equal protection challenge to ICWA); In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 126-29 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (rejecting the existing Indian family doctrine). 
 139. See In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 635-36 (N.D. 2003); In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 1107 
(Okla. 2004).  
 140. In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d at 636 (citations omitted). 
 141. In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d at 1107. 
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legislatures in sixteen states have rejected the existing Indian family doctrine, 
including in two—Oklahoma and Kansas—that initially adopted it.142 
The courts that have rejected equal protection challenges and refused to 
apply the existing Indian family doctrine focus on the clear language and 
purposes of ICWA.143 These courts also recognize, as several scholars have 
documented, that judicially crafted exceptions to ICWA would replicate the 
very circumstance that the Act aimed to redress: that of non-Indians, and state 
courts in particular, passing judgment on the validity of Native identity and 
culture.144 Further, as Lorie M. Graham has argued, the existing Indian family 
doctrine tragically reenacts the historical traumas that necessitated ICWA’s 
passage.145 Many Indian people struggle to overcome the legacies of forced 
separations from their tribes that were the direct result of policies that 
devalued Native family structures and cultivated animosity toward Indian 
culture.146 When their difficulties plunge them into a world governed by state 
 
 142. The sixteen states where courts or legislatures have rejected (or refused to adopt) the 
existing Indian family doctrine by case law or statute are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 
781 P.2d 973, 977-78 (Alaska 1989); Michael J. v. Michael J., 7 P.3d 960, 963-64 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2000); In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 20-22 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 
925, 931-32 (Idaho 1993); In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Ill. 1995) (applying 
ICWA notwithstanding arguments in favor of adopting a version of the existing 
Indian family doctrine); In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Iowa 2005) (“A state court 
does not have discretion to determine the applicability of . . . this chapter to a child 
custody proceeding based upon whether an Indian child is part of an existing Indian 
family.” (alteration in original) (quoting IOWA CODE § 232B.5(2))); In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 
543, 547-51 (Kan. 2009) (overruling In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 
1982)); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32, 35-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); In re Welfare of S.N.R., 
617 N.W.2d 77, 83-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 513-
14 (Mont. 1996); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 931-32 (N.J. 
1988); In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d at 635-36; In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d at 1107 (overruling In 
re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985)); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 
485, 489-90 (S.D. 1990); State ex rel. D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 998-1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.040(1)(a)-(b) (2016) (superseding In re Adoption of 
Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)). One of New York’s intermediate courts has also 
rejected the doctrine. In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 318-27 (App. Div. 2005). 
Courts in six states have applied the doctrine: Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Nevada, and Tennessee. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); 
In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988); In re Hampton, 658 So. 2d 331, 
333-37 (La. Ct. App. 1995); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re 
Parental Rights as to N.J., 221 P.3d 1255, 1264 (Nev. 2009); In re Morgan, No. 02A01 
-9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880, at *16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-29; In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 549-51. 
 144. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 624-36 (2002); Graham, supra 
note 125, at 34-43. 
 145. Graham, supra note 125, at 39-42. 
 146. See id. at 41-42. 
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social workers, their families are again torn apart and stamped, with cruel 
irony, as insufficiently Indian.147 
The courts that apply ICWA despite calls to avoid it are well aware of the 
tragic circumstances that often prompt attempts to deviate from the Act’s 
jurisdictional and placement priorities.148 By the time an appellate court 
reviews a case involving the foster care or adoptive placement of a child, there 
is inevitably a heart-wrenching story that has been compounded by delay. But 
as the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized when it overruled its own 
precedent and rejected the existing Indian family doctrine, ICWA itself has 
flexibility to address necessary departures from its procedural and placement 
preferences.149 Furthermore, some of the hardest cases arise because social 
service workers, attorneys, and guardians ad litem either are unaware of or 
intentionally flout ICWA’s requirements at the outset. In both In re Bridget R. 
and Adoptive Couple, for example, there were attempts to submerge the 
biological father’s tribal member identity in order to facilitate placement with 
non-Indians.150 Even when ICWA avoidance is not quite so blatant, mistakes 
made early in the process—including failure to obtain information about the 
child’s heritage, identify the appropriate tribes, and contact the relevant entity 
within the tribes—result in violations of the Act that become self-fulfilling 
prophecies: a child’s stability is at stake, which militates against applying 
ICWA.151  
 
 147. See id.  
148. See, e.g., In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88 (“We share the court’s concern for a 
dependent child’s interests in permanence and stability . . . . But we believe this concern 
can and should be accommodated by the ICWA without resort to the existing Indian 
family doctrine’s strained interpretation of the Act.”).  
 149. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 551 (Kan. 2009) (noting that the Act’s placement preferences 
include a “good cause” exception); see 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2015) (“In any adoptive 
placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence 
of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended 
family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 150. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 517 (Ct. App. 1996); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
731 S.E.2d 550, 554 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013); see also Graham, supra  
note 125, at 37 (noting that in In re Bridget R., “the attorney went so far as to urge the 
father to remove any reference to his Native American ancestry from the adoption 
forms”). 
 151. See Christine Metteer, The Existing Indian Family Exception: An Impediment to the Trust 
Responsibility to Preserve Tribal Existence and Culture as Manifested in the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 647, 657-58 (1997) (discussing the attorney in In re 
Bridget R., who told his Native American client to lie about the client’s heritage to make 
the adoption process easier); Karen Gray Young, Note, Do We Have It Right This Time?: 
An Analysis of the Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Washington’s Indian Child Welfare 
Act, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1229, 1252-53 (2013) (discussing statistics documenting 
noncompliance with ICWA in various states). 
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While the hard cases land in state appellate courts and therefore often 
receive media attention, the many ICWA success stories go unnoticed. ICWA 
frequently results in restoration of the child to her family. In other cases, 
placements with relatives or tribal foster or adoptive families occur without 
delay or incident. And in cases where Indian children are not placed according 
to ICWA preferences because there is “good cause” under the Act to deviate 
from them, plans are often made to cultivate the children’s connections to their 
tribes and cultures nonetheless, and the non-Indian foster or adoptive families 
are often happy to cooperate in such arrangements.152 For these reasons, 
ICWA is described in some child welfare circles as a model for best practices 
concerning how to address issues of foster care and adoptive placement.153 If 
the Supreme Court strikes down ICWA on equal protection grounds, all of this 
will be swept aside in pursuit of formal colorblind equality. 
An equal protection challenge to ICWA starts, necessarily, with an 
individual case in which a disadvantage to an Indian child can be plausibly 
alleged. But if federal courts accept the invitation to scrutinize the statute, 
rather than call attention to the ways that ICWA allows for exceptions on its 
own terms, they will necessarily undermine the good that ICWA does for 
Indian children, tribes, and families in the name of a colorblind agenda that 
threatens the legal foundations of justice for all American Indians.154 As 
discussed in Part II below, there are strong historical and structural reasons for 
courts not to make that ill-advised foray.  
B. Gaming and Commercial Interests 
Non-Indians have also raised equal protection challenges to economic 
regulation that recognizes tribal powers, particularly in the context of 
 
 152. As director of the American Indian Law Clinic at the University of Colorado Law 
School from 1996 to 1999, I litigated ICWA cases that had each of these outcomes. See 
also Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 104th Cong. 134 (1996) (statement of W. Ron Allen, President, National 
Congress of American Indians) (“Our tribes have taken the position that ICWA works 
well and, despite some highly publicized cases, continues to work well.”); id. at 26 
(statement of Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen., United States Department of 
Justice) (“Under ICWA, courts are able to tailor foster care and adoptive placements of 
Indian children to meet the best interests of children, families and tribes. We under-
stand that the vast majority of these cases are adjudicated without significant 
problems.”).  
 153. See, e.g., Brief of Casey Family Programs et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent Birth Father at 2-5, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) 
(No. 12-399). 
 154. See Krakoff, supra note 15, at 326-28.  
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gaming.155 In KG Urban Enterprises v. Patrick, a non-Indian development 
company argued that a Massachusetts gaming law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by giving priority to federally recognized tribes.156 The First 
Circuit ultimately denied that claim, but during the course of the litigation, 
several published decisions adopted the plaintiffs’ framing of the equal 
protection issues.157 For this reason alone, KG Urban warrants some discussion. 
In addition, KG Urban’s attorney, former Solicitor General Paul Clement, also 
represented the guardian ad litem in Adoptive Couple.158 Clement, along with 
conservative interest groups, has long shown interest in overturning or 
narrowing Mancari.159 There is therefore ample reason to think that the 
arguments raised in KG Urban will resurface in other contexts. 
Similar to the equal protection challenges to ICWA, the gaming cases take 
place in a context in which Congress has legislated in support of tribal rights. 
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)160 in the wake of a 
Supreme Court decision that affirmed tribes’ inherent right to conduct gaming 
activity on tribal lands.161 IGRA provided a federal statutory basis for 
regulating Indian gaming to ensure that tribes would be the primary 
beneficiaries of gaming revenue.162 IGRA also struck a compromise, however, 
by accommodating states’ interests in controlling the level and amount of 
gaming occurring within their boundaries. To engage in certain high-stakes 
categories of gaming (defined as “class III gaming”), tribes have to negotiate 
with the state to achieve gaming compacts.163 If states prohibit class III gaming 
 
 155. See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 731-36 (9th Cir. 
2003) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to state-tribal gaming compacts under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); see also Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Mangalick Enters., 
633 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594-95 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act).  
 156. 693 F.3d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing the claims and state statutory scheme). 
 157. See id. at 17-25 (analyzing the equal protection claim); KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 
Civil Action No. 11-12070-NMG, 2014 WL 108307, at *8-12 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014) 
(ruling against the plaintiffs but accepting their framing of the question concerning 
whether a preference for tribes is a discriminatory racial preference); KG Urban 
Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 402-05 (D. Mass. 2012) (applying Mancari but 
questioning its approach), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 158. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 159. See Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault on 
Morton v. Mancari, FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 47, 48, 55. 
 160. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2015)). 
 161. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-19, 221-22 (1987). 
 162. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702. 
 163. Id. § 2703(6)-(8) (defining class III gaming); id. § 2710(d) (describing the conditions for 
class III gaming, including the state compact requirement). 
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altogether, then they do not have to enter into compacts with tribes. But if 
states do allow class III gaming, they are required to “negotiate . . . in good faith” 
with tribes that request compacts.164  
The Massachusetts Gaming Act, subject to constitutional challenge in KG 
Urban, divided the state into three regions for purposes of issuing gaming 
licenses.165 The state law limited the total number of high-stakes licenses to 
three and the number in any given region to one.166 The law also gave priority 
to the state’s two federally recognized tribes—the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 
and the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head—in the event that they completed 
other legal steps necessary to open class III casinos.167 KG Urban argued that 
the Massachusetts Gaming Act violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
favored tribes to the disadvantage of non-Indians.168 
The federal district court initially rejected KG Urban’s equal protection 
claim, citing Mancari.169 The court volunteered, however, that if it “were 
addressing the issue as one of first impression, it would treat Indian tribal 
status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial classification subject to varying levels of 
scrutiny depending on the authority making it and the interests at stake.”170 
The lowest level of scrutiny would apply to “[f]ederal laws relating to native 
land, tribal status or Indian culture . . . because such laws fall squarely within 
the historical and constitutional authority of Congress to regulate core Indian 
affairs.”171 “Laws granting gratuitous Indian preferences divorced from those 
interests . . . would be subject to more searching scrutiny.”172 The court’s lone 
concrete example of such a law, not coincidentally, was one “granting tribes a 
quasi-monopoly on casino gaming.”173 (Ironically, the court’s own rationale—
to subject laws outside of Congress’s constitutional authority to higher 
scrutiny—would not apply to regulation of gaming, which falls well within 
any definition of “commerce” and is thus defensible under the Indian 
Commerce Clause.)174 Despite these musings, the court denied KG Urban’s 
 
 164. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
 165. KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 93 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 6, 11 & nn.7-8. 
 168. Id. at 12. 
 169. KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404-05 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 170. Id. at 404. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. The dominant reading of the Indian Commerce Clause is that it authorizes very broad 
authority in Indian affairs. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). Recent scholarship has 
footnote continued on next page 
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motion for a preliminary injunction because the equal protection claim was 
unlikely to succeed on the merits given that “Mancari remains good law.”175  
The district court’s willingness to substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress about what might comprise “core” Indian affairs resonates with the 
state court decisions in the “existing Indian family doctrine” cases discussed 
above.176 There, state courts employed their own assessments of whether 
families were sufficiently Indian despite clear definitions under ICWA.177 Also, 
the KG Urban district court and the courts construing ICWA expressed 
discomfort with the lineal descent or blood quantum aspect of tribal 
identification and accordingly questioned Mancari’s distinction between 
political and racial definitions of Indians.178 
On appeal, the First Circuit did not entertain the district court’s invitation 
to revise its understanding of Mancari. But the appellate court nonetheless 
breathed life into KG Urban’s equal protection claim by questioning whether 
Massachusetts could enact legislation protective of tribal rights.179 It directed 
the district court to consider whether the state had violated KG Urban’s rights 
by requiring the corporation to wait an unreasonably long time for a 
determination of its license application due to the pendency of a claim by the 
Mashpee Tribe.180 
On remand, the district court once again rejected KG Urban’s equal 
protection claim. But the court, without explanation, accepted KG Urban’s 
framing of the question, which equated mere mention or acknowledgment of 
administrative preferences for a federally recognized tribe as possible evidence 
of “discriminatory intent.”181 The court ultimately found no evidence of such 
 
questioned whether the power is as boundless as the Court suggests, but even a cabined 
understanding of congressional authority in Indian affairs would include legislation 
addressing tribal powers to conduct economic enterprises. See Ablavsky, supra note 24, 
at 1028-32 (discussing the historical understanding of “commerce” in the context of 
Indian affairs); see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2566-67 (2013) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a narrow understanding of congressional power 
in Indian affairs but one that nonetheless would include commercial interactions with 
tribes). 
 175. KG Urban, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 176. See supra Part I.A. 
 177. See supra Part I.A. 
 178. KG Urban, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 403-04; In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 726-30 (Ct. 
App. 2001); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 527-28 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 179. KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 180. Id. at 25-28. The Mashpee Tribe, one of the federally recognized tribes in southeast 
Massachusetts, had begun negotiations for a gaming compact and was awaiting a 
decision on whether its land would be taken into trust by the federal government. See 
id. at 25-26. 
 181. KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, Civil Action No. 11-12070-NMG, 2014 WL 108307, at *8-
10 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014). 
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intent, but it skipped over an important threshold question: Why should a 
state law that recognizes the rights of federally recognized tribes in the 
economic context be analyzed through the lens of racial discrimination?  
This unexplained move by the district court was likely the result of 
confusing language in the First Circuit’s opinion concerning when states, as 
opposed to the federal government, can enact legislation affecting tribes.182 As 
a general matter, states lack the federal government’s broad authority to 
legislate concerning tribes or to regulate tribes or their members in Indian 
country.183 However, state laws or classifications affecting tribes uniquely will 
be upheld against equal protection challenges so long as they implement, 
reflect, or effectuate federal laws or policies.184 States, in other words, cannot 
create their own Indian policies, nor can they enact legislation that 
discriminates against tribes or their members, but they may pass laws that 
further federal Indian law policies and goals.185 The First Circuit’s approach to 
this area of law—a subject at the crossroads of state limitations to regulate 
tribes and tribes’ rights to be free from discrimination—gave undue support for 
the idea that state accommodation of tribal rights is the same as a state 
preference based on race.186 
 
 182. See KG Urban, 693 F.3d at 18-20 (stating correctly that states lack the authority to set 
Indian policy but then mistakenly concluding that states therefore engage in race-based 
discrimination simply by acknowledging tribes as governments and accommodating 
that unique status). 
 183. This principle has been in place since Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The general topic of limitations on state 
regulation in Indian country comprises a significant portion of federal Indian law, and 
a full treatment is beyond the scope of this Article. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
24, § 6.03[1][a], at 511-13 (describing the general rule that states lack authority in Indian 
country); id. § 6.03[1][b], at 514-17 (providing exceptions to that general rule). 
 184. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 501-02 (1979) (holding that a state law passed in furtherance of a federal statute 
authorizing state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country does not violate tribal 
members’ rights to equal protection); see also Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. 
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214-15, 1218-20 (5th Cir. 1991); St. Paul Intertribal Hous. 
Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411-13 (D. Minn. 1983); N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience 
Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1998) (“[W]hile ‘States do not enjoy th[e] 
same unique relationship,’ they may adopt laws and policies to reflect or effectuate 
Federal laws designed ‘to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians’ without 
opening themselves to the charge that they have engaged in race-based discrimination.” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 501)). 
 185. See Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 733-35 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding against an equal protection challenge a state law granting a monopoly on 
casino-style gaming to tribes); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 6.04[1]-[2], at 
530-36 (summarizing the federal power to authorize state jurisdiction and its limita-
tions). 
 186. See KG Urban, 693 F.3d at 19-20. 
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The Massachusetts Gaming Act aimed to create and regulate a class III 
gaming economy that, pursuant to IGRA, had to accommodate the federally 
recognized tribes located in the state.187 The Act contemplated just one class III 
enterprise per region and anticipated that the state’s tribes, located only in 
southeast Massachusetts, might obtain that region’s single license.188 The state’s 
interest, presumably, was in capping the total number of high-stakes gaming 
enterprises while simultaneously accommodating its obligations under federal 
law to allow tribal gaming under IGRA’s terms.189 Even if the state mentioned 
tribes specifically in its rationale for the permitting process under the Act, 
doing so should not have triggered heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.190 The state was merely anticipating that federally 
recognized tribes would exercise their rights under federal law to enter into 
gaming compacts. 
The First Circuit’s and the district court’s confusion over this in KG Urban, 
however, reflects the success that non-Indian enterprises (and their powerful 
advocates) have had in creating a narrative of colorblind injustice in this 
context. Taking a step back from the intricacies of the claims and the courts’ 
analyses, it should strike most of us as odd that KG Urban, a successful 
development corporation hoping to edge in to casino gaming, could use the 
legacy of Brown v. Board of Education191 to leverage its position. Yet that is 
where the Court’s colorblind approach may be leading. The KG Urban 
decisions, while ultimately rejecting the equal protection challenges to the 
Massachusetts Gaming Act, conflated federally recognized tribes with racial 
groups and tiptoed toward the kinds of interference with state economic 
legislation that have been generally disapproved since the Lochner era.192 This 
approach would be very troubling for tribes, but it should also raise concerns 
for anyone with qualms about excessive judicial review on behalf of politically 
powerful constituencies.  
 
 187. See id. at 4-5. 
 188. See id. at 4-7. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 733-35. 
 191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 192. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1259-62 (1986) (discussing post-Lochner decisions in which the Supreme Court upheld 
regulations of economic activity); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal 
Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude . . . .”). 
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C. Equal Protection, Colorblind Constitutionalism, and American Indian 
Law 
Classifications are everywhere in the law, which is why courts sweep away 
most equal protection challenges by consigning them to rational basis 
review.193 The equal protection claims that warrant higher levels of judicial 
scrutiny are those that include allegations of discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, or gender, as well as those that allege discriminatory allocation 
of other fundamental rights.194 In the era of constitutional colorblindness and 
opposition to affirmative action, courts have extended their heightened 
scrutiny to classifications that aim to increase minority representation in work 
and educational settings.195 As Reva Siegel has described, the equal protection 
framework has shifted from considering whether a classification subordinates 
a minority group unable to overcome majoritarian politics to whether the 
classification includes race, gender, or ethnicity, in which case heightened 
scrutiny is automatic.196 This has opened the door to searching judicial 
scrutiny of any and all programs using race or ethnicity, even those designed to 
overcome discrimination against disadvantaged groups.197  
 
 193. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid 
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”). 
 194. See id. (stating that classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, “personal 
rights protected by the Constitution,” and gender are subject to higher levels of 
scrutiny). 
 195. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (stating that heightened 
scrutiny applies to state higher education affirmative action plans that consider race); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (holding that affirmative 
action plans for federal contracts must meet strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to a 
city affirmative action plan). 
 196. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1476-78 (2004) (describing 
how equal protection law evolved from expressing antisubordination to anticlassifica-
tion norms in the five decades after Brown). More recently, Siegel has argued that a 
third approach has emerged, which she labels “antibalkanization.” Reva B. Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 
120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282, 1300-03 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “race 
moderates” embrace a view of equal protection that recognizes historical racial 
injustice but aims for solutions that promote social cohesion).  
 197. See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207, 2214 (upholding the university’s affirmative action 
program on the grounds that the holistic admissions process used race only as one 
subfactor among many and was narrowly tailored to meet the state’s substantial 
objective of providing diverse educational experiences); see also Helen Norton, The 
Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 197, 231-35 (2010) (analyzing affirmative action cases). 
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There are some signs that the Court’s approach to equal protection 
doctrine is shifting subtly, reviving a more nuanced and contextualized 
understanding of barriers to equality. First, the Court struck down bans on 
same-sex marriage, in part based on equal protection concerns.198 Second, the 
Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, while 
preserving strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs, nonetheless upheld 
the university’s admissions policies, which used race as “a ‘factor of a factor of a 
factor’ in the holistic-review” of applicants’ files.199 It is possible that these cases 
reflect a rejection of the highly formalist approach that colorblind 
constitutionalism entails in favor of at least some recognition of the 
importance of context for rooting out inequality. 
If so, the Court can continue to do the least harm in the American Indian 
law and equal protection contexts simply by following, rather than 
overturning, precedent or legislative enactments. In the Native nation context, 
the Court need only exercise restraint. If laws or policies further the federal 
government’s unique obligations to Indian tribes, then the Court should hew to 
Mancari and stay its hand.200 
Laws that perpetuate tribal survival (like ICWA) and safeguard tribal 
economic powers (like IGRA and complementary state laws) fall squarely 
within the government’s unique relationship with tribes. Yet these laws, which 
assist tribal efforts to emerge from their racialized and subordinated status, are 
 
 198. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606-08 (2015). Obergefell built on previous 
cases that recognized associational, privacy, and due process rights for gays and 
lesbians, but the rhetorical structure of Obergefell is in many ways analogous to Justice 
Brennan’s equal protection approach in Plyler v. Doe, which struck down laws that 
banned the children of undocumented immigrants from attending public schools. 457 
U.S. 202, 222-26 (1982). Like Plyler, Obergefell asks whether a combination of values and 
factors calls for judicial intervention in a scheme that treats some people differently 
from others. The Obergefell opinion might be a sign that the Court remains committed 
to interrogating how laws instigate and perpetuate status-based inequality rather than 
simply identifying certain formal categories of distinction. It is more likely, however, 
that Obergefell is singular, reflecting Justice Kennedy’s particular concern for discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians, as well as his interest in promoting individual dignity. 
See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 165 (2016) (describing 
Obergefell and related precedents as announcing that “sexual orientation enjoys a tier of 
its own”); see also Bharat Malkhani, Dignity and the Death Penalty in the United States 
Supreme Court, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 192 (2017) (describing Justice Kennedy’s 
conceptions of dignity). 
 199. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 
608 (W.D. Tex. 2009)). 
 200. Note that this leaves open the possibility that if a federal classification concerning 
tribes or tribal members does not further the unique relationship between tribes and 
the federal government, then it should be subject to some form of heightened scrutiny. 
As discussed above, this avenue, though seemingly closed off by Antelope and its 
progeny, could be revived consistently with Mancari. See supra notes 69-72 and 
accompanying text. 
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the target of today’s equal protection challenges.201 If courts do not adhere to 
the Mancari approach, equal protection as anticlassification will become a tool 
to resurrect the very forms of racial discrimination that subjugated Native 
peoples and brought them nearly to the brink of elimination.202 One such form 
of discrimination is the assignment of inferior characteristics, such as 
“savageness,” to tribes collectively to justify taking their land and destroying 
their familial and tribal structures.203 Another is the imposition of biological 
(as opposed to territorial or affiliation-based) membership requirements and 
forced-assimilation policies designed to make Indians eventually disappear.204 
The pernicious stereotypes that accompanied these policies—what Renee Ann 
Cramer has described as the “common sense” of anti-Indian racism205—lurk not 
far beneath the surface of the ICWA and gaming cases described above. In the 
ICWA context, tribes and tribal members are deemed unfit to judge what is 
best for their individual children, and tribal affiliation is described disparaging-
ly as nothing more than a remote blood tie rather than as a political and 
cultural connection to a Native nation.206 In the gaming and economic 
contexts, tribes—described as “quasi-racial” collections of individuals rather 
than as governments—are viewed as standing in the way of non-Indian 
economic progress.207 These are the same tropes that drove America’s worst 
 
 201. It is worth noting that the Court’s approach in Obergefell and Plyler led it to strike down 
state and local laws. The added justificatory burden in those cases—to explain why 
federal judges should overturn state and local democratic decisions—is absent for 
courts applying Mancari. The Mancari approach defers to, rather than undermines, 
Congress. Deference to the political branches is thus another reason for the Court to 
maintain its current rational basis review of laws that further Congress’s unique 
relationship with tribes.  
 202. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1070, 1122-31.  
 203. See Berger, supra note 43, at 593; see also Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-
Indian Racism: Reactions to Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment, 31 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 313, 317-19 (2006) (summarizing scholarship that explores and 
catalogues the racist stereotypes that drove colonial and postcolonial policies of Indian 
dispossession and that continue to pervade contemporary culture and views). 
 204. See EVA MARIE GARROUTTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE 
AMERICA 21-37 (2003); Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1067-70. 
 205. See Cramer, supra note 203, at 316-17. Cramer builds on Ian Haney López’s vocabulary 
of a “common sense” of racism, by which he means the ways that racist constructs have 
infiltrated American views of the world and therefore become naturalized. See id. 
(citing IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 119 
(2003)). 
 206. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (“[U]nder the State 
Supreme Court’s reading, the Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great 
disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian.”).  
 207. See KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Cramer, supra note 203, at 
325-26. Cramer makes the additional observation that lurking beneath this misunder-
standing of tribes as collections of individuals connected solely “by blood” is the 
footnote continued on next page 
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and most racialized treatment of tribes, and they should not be resurrected in 
the name of a supposedly race-neutral equal protection agenda. Moreover, as 
discussed in Part II below, the trigger for this ill-advised foray into second-
guessing laws that benefit tribes—tribes’ supposed “racial” status—is in fact the 
basis for tribes’ distinct constitutional standing. Ancestry and lineage tie tribes 
to their precontact existence and justify their unique place in our constitution-
al order.  
II. Tribes and the Constitutional Minimum 
The parties bringing equal protection challenges against federal programs 
and legislation benefitting American Indians do not accept the Mancari 
approach of deferring to classifications that further the government-to-
government relationship with Native nations. To the contrary, they question 
the very basis for tribes’ distinct treatment under the Constitution by 
conflating lineal descent from an ancestral group with the invidious 
sociopolitical category of “race.” In Adoptive Couple, for example, the non-Indian 
parties urged the Court to view the child whose custody was in dispute as 
someone with a fractional racial identity rather than as a potential citizen of 
the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.208 And in KG Urban, the non-Indian 
development company argued that tribal governments should be viewed no 
differently from collections of racially connected people because they have 
membership criteria that rely on ancestry.209 These challenges equate tribal 
status and membership with race and use that as the basis for urging courts to 
overthrow statutory protections for tribes and their members. 
Yet Mancari makes an unassailable descriptive point about tribes: they are 
governments, and membership in a tribe is therefore a political status.210 
Native nations are political entities, and each of these nations therefore has 
 
ironically complementary suspicion that they are not really Indian at all. In analyzing 
the backlash to tribal recognition that resulted from the economic success of the 
Mashantucket Pequot’s gaming enterprise, Cramer observed:  
Mashantucket Pequot’s “inauthentic” Indian identity becomes its own disabling certitude; 
alluding to the Mashantucket Pequot tribe becomes shorthand for “undeserving” and “inau-
thentic” Indians. Anti-Mashantucket Pequot rhetoric becomes anti-Indian rhetoric; in the new 
common sense racism fueled by casino success, the Pequots are a trope for everything a “real” 
Indian is not. 
  Id. at 325. 
 208. See supra Part I.A. 
 209. See supra Part I.B. 
 210. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974).  
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powers that nonstate entities lack.211 Mancari’s approach appropriately 
accounts for this legal-political landscape, noting that empowering courts to 
strike down laws affecting tribes could put myriad statutes and regulations in 
jeopardy.212  
This legal-political landscape nonetheless raises an important question at 
the heart of the equal protection challenges: What distinguishes “tribes” from 
other groups that have no constitutional basis for this distinctive political 
recognition? Since the Founding, the United States has recognized the 
indigenous peoples of North America as entities with powers of self-
governance and property rights.213 While the precise source and scope of the 
federal government’s power in Indian affairs has been the subject of significant 
debate,214 the very fact of a government-to-government relationship is beyond 
question.215 It is also clear that what justifies this relationship is that American 
 
 211. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,826 (May 4, 2016); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 24, § 4.01[1][a], at 207. 
 212. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
 213. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 164-70. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING 
ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 
(1997) (documenting the bilateral nature of treaty negotiations between the United 
States and Indian tribes). 
 214. The textual sources are the Treaty and Commerce Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,  
cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Some scholars have argued that international law also provides 
justification for, as well as inherent limitations on, federal power in Indian affairs. See 
Frickey, supra note 24, at 55-56, 64, 74-75 (arguing that, to the extent that federal power 
over Indian affairs is extraconstitutional, international law is its source and also 
implies limitations on its scope). Others contend that congressional power is limited 
based on varying interpretive theories. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal 
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115-18 (2002) (“[T]here is no 
acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for the exercise of 
any federal authority over Indian tribes without their consent manifested through 
treaty.”); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limita-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984) (contending that the historical basis for a broad 
understanding of congressional power in Indian affairs is “no longer applicable”); 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing 
and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 265 
(arguing that federal power should be rejected wholesale as irremediably genocidal). 
Gregory Ablavsky has documented that early Americans did not look to specific 
constitutional clauses for the source of authority in Indian affairs. Rather, “most of 
those who drafted and interpreted the Constitution wrote of authority over Indian 
affairs as an interrelated, coherent bundle of powers.” Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1040. 
 215. Even scholars who are skeptical of tribes’ inherent powers or the exclusivity of federal 
authority in Indian affairs acknowledge some form of political status for tribes and 
some degree of federal authority in Indian affairs. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 259 (2007); 
Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2004).  
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Indians were on the continent first.216 As William Quinn has described, this 
fact was so obvious to the Founders that formal definitions for the term “tribe” 
were lacking in the early years of the republic.217 Nonetheless, “[t]he 
inescapable conclusion . . . is that all the colonial powers recognized at least 
those tribes with which they treated as separate, autonomous political  
entities . . . . The new Republic was legatee of a heritage that recognized, albeit 
sometimes grudgingly, the sovereignty of Indian tribes native to the 
continent.”218 Tribes—as political sovereigns recognized by the federal 
government and denominated as such—therefore have ties to precontact 
peoples and indeed must have such ties to be acknowledged as governments 
outside of the state-based federalism framework.219 Without those 
connections, a group of people getting together to form a government within 
the United States would be an entirely different matter. In the more benign 
version, it could be an attempt to form a new state; otherwise, it is something 
closer to secession.220 Indigenous peoples’ claims to self-government are 
exceptional in this sense, but in the U.S. context, they are an exception 
enshrined in the Constitution.221 
To be a tribe, and therefore subject to Mancari’s approach to equal protec-
tion analysis, requires connection to an ancestral group.222 This aspect of 
federally recognized Indian tribes is reflected in the history and structure of the 
Constitution, the common law definitions of “tribe” that evolved after the 
Founding, federal regulations governing tribal recognition today, and 
definitions of indigenous peoples under international law. Each of these 
sources is discussed in turn below. 
 
 216. See Quinn, supra note 26, at 333-38. 
 217. Id. at 336 (“[I]t was usually more clear . . . to the person of 1789, or even 1889, exactly 
who was an Indian and what Indian community was a tribe, than it is to the person of 
1989. Thus the question of recognition was more of a non-issue for the first century of 
the United States than for the second century.”). 
 218. Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added). 
 219. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (affirming tribes’ status as 
governments with retained inherent powers to regulate their members and territory); 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (denominating tribes “domestic 
dependent nations” based on their status as unique sovereign entities within the U.S. 
legal framework).  
 220. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 221. A full discussion of the nature of tribal sovereignty under American constitutional law 
is beyond the scope of my argument. For exemplary scholarship on this topic, see 
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 54-63 (1987). See also Philip P. Frickey, A 
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority 
over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8-13 (1999). 
 222. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2584-85 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
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A. Constitutional Text and Context  
Tribes’ political status is woven into the text and structure of our Consti-
tution, and yet that document provides no guidance regarding how to define 
“tribe.” In terms of constitutional text, the Indian Commerce Clause recognizes 
tribes as distinct entities.223 The other textual source for the federal 
government’s relationship with tribes is the Treaty Clause,224 which 
indisputably includes the power to enter into treaties with tribes even though 
it does not mention them specifically.225 The Constitution includes these 
powers because addressing the presence and territorial claims of indigenous 
peoples was central to the country’s formation.226 As many scholars and jurists 
have noted, all of federal Indian law, and by extension much of American law 
itself, is grounded in this initial point of origin: indigenous peoples occupied 
the continent, and their presence and claims had to be addressed.227 But what 
was the definition of indigenous peoples—labeled American “Indian tribes” in 
the Constitution—for the purpose of this unique treatment and recognition? 
Textual guidance is lacking, but the historical context points to some clear 
answers. The origins of the federal relationship with tribes lie in early 
encounters by indigenous peoples with Spain, England, and other colonizing 
nations.228 When Spanish explorers first arrived on the islands and shores of 
North America, they encountered populated and settled places. They drew 
their justifications for occupying and eventually assuming control over lands 
occupied by others from early international law doctrines.229 Those doctrines 
were often blatantly self-serving, and if they were not, they were abandoned as 
 
 223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 224. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 225. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1041-42 (2014) 
(recounting the history of the Founding and the significance of concerns about 
consolidating federal power over Indian affairs to the drafting of the Treaty and 
Supremacy Clauses). Ablavsky argues persuasively that the consolidation of federal 
power was justified in large part by concerns about Indian tribes and the threats they 
posed. See id. at 1062-64.  
 226. See WILLIAMS, supra note 213, at 20-21; Ablavsky, supra note 225, at 1002. 
 227. See Ablavsky, supra note 225, at 1002; see also William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian 
Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). 
 228. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 1.02[1], at 8-17; Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian 
Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43-47 (1947) [hereinafter Cohen, Original Indian Title]; Felix S. 
Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 20 
(1942) [hereinafter Cohen, Spanish Origin]. 
 229. See Cohen, Spanish Origin, supra note 228, at 17; see also Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1059-
61 (“There was widespread agreement . . . that the law of nations should govern 
relations between the United States and Natives. It was less clear what the content of 
that law would be.”); Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 181-83 (2014) (describing 
early international law approaches to contact with indigenous peoples). 
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often as they were followed.230 But the felt necessity to articulate any legal 
principles at all reflected the stark reality that the Spanish—and later the 
British, French, and eventually Americans—did not confront a so-called terra 
nullius, or “blank land.”231 Nor did they find stray individuals roaming the 
continent. Rather, as William Canby describes, “the British Crown and several 
of its colonies dealt with the Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign 
nations.”232 The precontact presence of tribes, in other words, created the basis 
for early international law governing the efforts to colonize and then settle 
North America.233 
In the postrevolutionary period, the presence and claims of Native peoples 
animated many of the discussions about the extent and scope of federal power. 
Gregory Ablavsky has argued that concerns about Native nations and the 
threat they posed to the young United States propelled arguments supporting a 
stronger federal government and were thus foundational to the Constitution’s 
structure and adoption.234 Federal assertions of the right to obtain Indian 
property likewise accounted for indigenous peoples’ prior presence on the 
land.235 The so-called discovery doctrine, deployed first by European nations 
and adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh,236 was a rationale 
for acquiring territory from peoples who were here first, not merely from 
individuals with competing claims to territory.237 Similarly, early federal 
 
 230. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 96-108 (1990). 
 231. See id. Despite knowing that the lands were populated by indigenous peoples, some 
colonizing countries adopted the doctrine of terra nullius to justify claiming ownership 
of indigenous territory and resources. See MATTIAS ÅHRÉN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
STATUS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 16-18 (2016). 
 232. Canby, supra note 227, at 2. 
 233. See Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1059-61; Carpenter & Riley, supra note 229, at 181-83. 
 234. See Ablavsky, supra note 225, at 1002; see also John R. Wunder, “Merciless Indian Savages” 
and the Declaration of Independence: Native Americans Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee 
Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 65-66 (2000-2001) (noting that the grievances 
against the Crown in the Declaration of Independence included the Crown’s failure to 
mitigate the threat posed by “merciless Indian savages” to the frontier colonies (quoting 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 24 (U.S. 1776))).  
 235. See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(describing early treatymaking policies, which had the purpose of obtaining land 
cessions from tribes); see also Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 228, at 43-47.  
 236. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-88 (1823) (discussing the origins of the doctrine, its use by 
European nations to justify their claims to property occupied by indigenous peoples, 
and the United States’ adoption of it). 
 237. See id.; Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1071-72 (noting that use of the term “doctrine of 
discovery” obscures the reality that “[i]n both international law and American practice 
respecting Native lands, purchase and possession played a far greater role than 
discovery and conquest”); Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 228, at 44-45; see also 
ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF 
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statutes prohibiting the sale of Indian land to individuals or states (known as 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts) acknowledged the distinct nature of Indian 
collective rights to property.238 The Trade and Intercourse Acts consolidated 
the power to obtain property from tribes in the federal government in order to 
ensure that those transactions would occur between peoples.239 In short, laws 
centralizing power over Indian tribes in the federal government and justifying 
the taking of Indian property assumed and depended on tribes’ precontact 
existence. 
As noted above, despite the centrality of indigenous peoples’ legal status to 
the formation of the United States, culminating in the distinct treatment of 
Indian tribes in the Constitution, there was virtually no Founding-era 
discussion about how to define those tribes.240 William Hagan describes this 
gap in an article addressing the related problem how to define individual 
American Indian identity.241 Hagan quotes an 1892 annual report by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas Jefferson Morgan, who was 
addressing the question “What is an Indian?”: 
“One would have supposed,” observed Morgan, “that this question would have 
been considered a hundred years ago and had been adjudicated long before this.” 
“Singularly enough, however, . . . it has remained in abeyance, and the Govern-
ment has gone on legislating and administering law without carefully discrimi-
nating as to those over whom it has a right to exercise such control.”242 
As Hagan and Commissioner Morgan observed, not only did the “founding 
fathers provide[] little guidance,” but the federal agencies first charged with 
addressing Indian affairs—the War Department and then the Interior 
 
DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 2-3 (2010) (critiquing the doctrine as it was 
articulated and exercised in all of the commonwealth countries). 
 238. These Acts are now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2015) and remain in effect with minor 
revisions. The first Trade and Intercourse Act was passed in 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-33, 1 
Stat. 137 (1790), but even it had origins in earlier enactments. One such enactment was 
the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787, which stated that Indians’ land and property  
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and 
liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised by 
Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for 
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them. 
  32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 340-41 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 
1936). These statutes were passed both to protect Native peoples’ interests and to shore 
up the federal government’s power to regulate relations with tribes and the settlement 
of the frontier. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 1.03[2], at 34-36. 
 239. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 1.03[2], at 35. 
 240. See Hagan, supra note 26, at 309-10; Quinn, supra note 26, at 352-53. 
 241. See Hagan, supra note 26, at 309. 
 242. Id. (quoting T.J. Morgan, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in SIXTY-FIRST 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR 5, 31 (1892)).  
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Department—did very little to “fill the gap” in the first decades of the new 
republic.243 
The absence of such definitions in the early years likely reflected nothing 
more than the stunning obviousness of the situation: Indian tribes were peoples 
already on the continent, whose claims to self-governance and property were 
therefore, literally, facts on the ground. As Native nations became folded into 
the domestic legal order, the impetus to define tribes grew. Case law, statutes, 
and eventually administrative criteria filled this gap but also reflected the 
changing priorities of the federal government concerning Indian policy. Those 
post-Founding-era definitions are discussed below, as are emerging definitions 
in international law. 
B. Definitions of Indigenous Peoples in Federal Common Law, Federal 
Regulations, and Contemporary International Law  
As described above, early international law, widely recognized as the 
source for American Indian law,244 spoke to the rules for interaction with 
Native peoples. Like the Constitution, however, early international law did not 
take on the task of defining tribes or indigenous peoples.245 As U.S. law for 
engaging with Native nations evolved from a species of international law to a 
body of domestic law, common law definitions emerged that served the U.S. 
purposes of categorization, bureaucratization, control, and elimination.246 
These definitions included the racialization of Native peoples and accompany-
ing derogatory characterizations.247 To be legally “Indian” depended, first and 
foremost, on the stakes for non-Indians in any particular case.248  
 
 243. Id. at 310. 
 244. See Carpenter & Riley, supra note 229, at 182 (“[M]any of the foundational interactions 
between indigenous peoples and Europeans occurred pursuant to international  
law . . . .”); Frickey, supra note 24, at 36-37 (summarizing the international law origins of 
federal Indian law).  
 245. Robert Williams has thoroughly documented that international law’s assumptions—
including that indigenous peoples were uncivilized and “savage”—were self-servingly 
negative in order to justify the unilateral assertion of European, and then American, 
power. See WILLIAMS, supra note 230, at 7; WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 223-36. But 
perhaps because of these assumptions, and the accompanying presumption and hope 
that indigenous peoples would not survive, early international law made no effort to 
identify and define “indigenous peoples” as such. 
 246. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1060-77 (summarizing the history of federal definitions of 
tribes); see also Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition: Soifer on 
Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 359, 362 (1997) (book review) 
(describing how colonial laws and policies shaped the legal construct of Indian tribes to 
serve the ends of the colonizing regime).  
 247. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1060-77. 
 248. See id. 
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In recent years, however, definitions have emerged that retain the com-
mon law elements of precolonial presence, attachment to land, and 
longstanding cultural and political institutions but that finally shed the 
discriminatory and racialized descriptions. Crucially, a continuous thread—
even throughout the period when tribes were defined in part by their supposed 
inferiority—is tribes’ ties to peoples here before the settlers arrived. The more 
recent definitions can be found in U.S. federal regulations governing tribal 
recognition and in contemporary international law on the rights of indigenous 
peoples.  
1. Federal common law definitions 
Early case law on questions of congressional power in Indian affairs 
included occasional discussion of how to define the objects of that power—the 
Indian tribes themselves. In United States v. Sandoval, the Court addressed 
whether Congress had the authority to define the New Mexico Pueblos as 
tribes under a federal statute banning the introduction of liquor into tribal 
territory.249 The Court held, as a general matter, that Congress has wide 
leeway to enter into relationships with tribes and pass legislation in 
furtherance of that relationship.250 Yet Congress, notwithstanding its broad 
authority, cannot “bring a community or body of people within the range of 
this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe.”251 Much of the Sandoval 
opinion describes the Pueblos in the most demeaning terms, justifying federal 
power on the basis of the Pueblos’ inferiority and dependency.252 But Sandoval 
also includes the following factors inclining in favor of treating a group as a 
tribe: treatment by the government as a distinct community, a history of 
separate existence, and “Indian lineage.”253 Sandoval thus articulates an early 
form of rationality review in the context of tribal definition: Congress 
rationally exercises its broad power to recognize tribes so long as they meet the 
Sandoval criteria.254 
Similarly, United States v. Montoya, decided twelve years earlier, defined a 
tribe as “a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community 
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though 
 
 249. 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913). 
 250. See id. at 45-46. 
 251. Id. at 46. 
 252. See id. at 39 (describing the Pueblos as “living in separate and isolated communities, 
adhering to primitive modes of life,” and “essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior 
people”). 
 253. Id. at 47. 
 254. See id. 
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sometimes ill-defined territory.”255 Shorn of their discriminatory language, 
these cases affirm that Congress’s power to recognize tribes and pass legislation 
concerning them hinges on tribes’ status as distinct political communities with 
ties to precontact aboriginal peoples, whether those ties are described as 
“lineage” (in Sandoval) or “race” (in Montoya).256 In the absence of such ties, 
Congress exceeds even its broad authority in Indian affairs to recognize a 
people as a “tribe.”257 
Cases in the modern era likewise include this element of connection to a 
distinct community with presettler ties to the land.258 In Joint Tribal Council of 
the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, the Passamaquoddy Tribe sued the United 
States to request representation in the Tribe’s Nonintercourse Act claims 
against Maine and Massachusetts for the unlawful taking of the Tribe’s 
property.259 The Department of the Interior refused the Tribe’s request, 
arguing that the Tribe lacked a government-to-government relationship with 
the United States and therefore was not a “tribe” under the Nonintercourse 
Act.260 The First Circuit quoted Montoya’s definition of a tribe, including its 
requirements of “a body of Indians of the same or similar race,” and held that 
the Passamaquoddy’s long history of treatment as a tribe by Maine, the federal 
government’s early acknowledgment that the Tribe was entitled to federal 
protection, and the Tribe’s clear political organization “plainly fit[]” Montoya’s 
definition.261 
The judicial definition of “tribe,” as it has emerged in the modern era, 
therefore includes the key elements of ties to ancestral territory, a distinct 
community, and, in the words of the Court in Sandoval and Montoya, Indian 
“lineage” or “race.” Cohen’s Handbook distills these criteria as “the broad 
requirements that: (a) the group have some ancestors who lived in what is now 
 
 255. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). 
 256. Extracting this nondiscriminatory thread from the law of tribal recognition neither 
justifies nor erases the history of defining tribes as inferior for the purposes of 
eliminating them. For more on the ineradicability of the racialization of tribes, see 
Krakoff, supra note 15, at 312-13, which describes how racialization of the Seminole 
served goals of settling Florida and preventing the settlement of American Indians in 
the newly acquired territory; and Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1065-75, which describes 
how inferiority was stitched into the early cases defining tribes. 
 257. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46. 
 258. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 3.02[4], at 138-39. 
 259. 528 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 260. Id. at 372-73. 
 261. Id. at 377 n.8. For further analysis of Passamaquoddy and other contemporary cases, see 
Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1078-81. 
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the United States before discovery by Europeans, and (b) the group be a ‘people 
distinct from others.’”262 
2. Administrative definitions: federal acknowledgment criteria 
Today, groups in the United States with indigenous identity can seek 
federal recognition as tribes through three channels: the courts, Congress, and 
the BIA’s administrative acknowledgment process. The Passamaquoddy and 
other tribes litigated their tribal status in the courts, but most tribes seeking 
federal recognition today do so through the BIA’s acknowledgment process.263 
Regulations governing this process were first overhauled in the 1970s, 
culminating in the 1978 criteria, which have since been amended twice, once in 
1994 and again in 2015.264 Before 1978, the BIA used an ad hoc approach to 
recognition based on factors developed by Felix Cohen in the 1930s. The Cohen 
factors largely focused on how the federal government and other tribes viewed 
or treated the petitioning tribe.265 The 1978 revisions were a response to the 
flood of acknowledgment petitions filed by tribes that had been omitted from 
the government’s list of federally recognized tribes, formalized for the first 
time in 1934.266 
The current federal acknowledgment regulations have roots in Cohen’s de 
facto approach but also include factors reflecting that tribes, to be recognized as 
such under the Constitution, must have ties to peoples who preceded European 
arrival. First, the regulations define the term “indigenous” to mean “native to 
the continental United States in that at least part of the petitioner’s territory at 
the time of first sustained contact extended into what is now the continental 
United States.”267 Second, several of the seven criteria for federal acknowledg-
ment include ties to peoples who are “native” in the same sense. These include 
 
 262. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 3.02[4], at 138-39 (quoting In re Kansas Indians, 72 
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1867)). 
 263. See Procedures for Federal Acknowledgment of Indian Tribes, 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2016). 
 264. See Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,862 (July 1, 
2015) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83); Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian 
Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 9280 (Feb. 25, 1994) (codified as amended 
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83). 
 265. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1076 (discussing the Cohen criteria); Quinn, supra note 26, 
at 358. 
 266. See Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1075-83 (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act’s 
definition, initial list of tribes, and subsequent need to recognize the many tribes 
inadvertently omitted from the list); Quinn, supra note 26, at 363; see also COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, § 3.02[2], at 133. 
 267. 25 C.F.R. § 83.1. 
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the criteria of “Indian entity identification,”268 “[c]ommunity,”269 and, perhaps 
most obviously, “[d]escent.”270 Each is discussed in turn below. 
The “Indian identity” requirement states that the petitioning group must 
have been “identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since 1900.”271 Likewise, the “[c]ommunity” criterion requires 
the petitioning tribe to show that it “comprises a distinct community and 
demonstrate[] that it existed as a community from 1900 until the present.”272 
When the BIA published proposed changes to the criteria in 2014, it suggested 
moving the date for Indian identity forward to 1934, the year the Indian 
Reorganization Act first created the list of recognized tribes.273 There was also 
discussion of whether the start date should be moved back to “historical times,” 
which is what it had been for the “[c]ommunity” criterion prior to the proposed 
changes.274 In the end, the BIA retained the 1900 start date for “Indian identity” 
and adopted it for purposes of “[c]ommunity” as well. 
The BIA provided many reasons for this seeming compromise between 
“historical times” and 1934. First, the years surrounding 1900 were a time of 
great pressure on tribes to assimilate and disband.275 Groups petitioning for 
recognition today therefore might find it difficult to provide any documenta-
tion dating from before that period.276 Further, for many tribes (presumably in 
the American West), their first sustained contact with non-Indians was not 
long before 1900.277 Westward expansion did not begin in earnest until the late 
1800s, and tribes in the Southwest in particular had no reason to document 
their status as governing entities for outsiders.278 In addition, the BIA 
 
 268. Id. § 83.11(a) (italics omitted). 
 269. Id. § 83.11(b) (italics omitted). 
 270. Id. § 83.11(e) (italics omitted). The other criteria are: “[p]olitical influence or authority,” a 
“[g]overning document,” “[u]nique membership,” and “[c]ongressional termination” 
(defined as a showing that the tribe was not previously terminated by Congress). Id.  
§ 83.11(c), (d), (f), (g) (italics omitted). 
 271. Id. § 83.11(a). 
 272. Id. § 83.11(b). 
 273. See Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,862, 37,868-69 
(July 1, 2015) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83) (discussing the 2014 proposed changes and 
justifications for retaining 1900 as the relevant date). 
 274. See id. at 37,867. “Historical times” was not defined with precision, but the 
understanding was that it referred to any period before which it would have been 
unnecessary for tribes to appear on any official federal list or otherwise be formally 
acknowledged by the federal government. See id. 
 275. See id. at 37,869. 
 276. See id. at 37,868.  
 277. Id. 
 278. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY 
POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (Penguin Books 1992) (1954) (chroni-
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explained that “based on its experience in nearly 40 years of implementing the 
regulations, every group that has proven its existence from 1900 forward has 
successfully proven its existence prior to that time as well, making 1900 to the 
present a reliable proxy for all of history but at less expense.”279 The criteria 
themselves, like the justifications for using 1900 as the starting point, therefore 
reflect an understanding that tribes, to be recognized as such, must have Indian 
identity and comprise a distinct community that extends back to the time 
before European and American contact. 
The “descent” criterion requires that “petitioner’s membership consists of 
individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe (or from historical 
Indian tribes that combined and functioned as a single autonomous political 
entity).”280 “Historical tribe,” it is clear, means a political entity composed of 
peoples who predate nonindigenous contact.281 The 2015 final rule did not 
adopt a proposed change that would have required instead that “at least 80 
percent” of petitioner’s membership descended from a historical tribe.282 The 
BIA explained that there were objections on both sides of the debate, with some 
urging a 100% descent requirement and others urging a lower requirement to 
account for lack of records.283 The BIA therefore decided to omit any 
quantitative measure but clarified that the 80% language merely reflected past 
decisions and that the policies would remain consistent with those practices.284 
Whether fixed at 80% or 100%, the import of this criterion is unmistakable: to 
be a federally recognized tribe today, there must be a strong showing of 
“descent” from (meaning ancestral ties to) a historical tribe. 
The federal criteria as a whole reflect both of the key aspects of Native 
nationhood: first, that the entity petitioning to be a tribe is a political 
community with a history of governance,285 and second, that the entity has ties 
 
cling the first nonindigenous mapping and exploration of the Southwest, which did 
not occur until after the Civil War). 
 279. Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,863. 
 280. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(e) (2016). 
 281. See Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,866-67. The 
BIA refers repeatedly to connections to “tribe or tribes” instead of “indigenous peoples.” 
But using the BIA’s vocabulary alone begins to sound somewhat circular, given that the 
regulations are supposed to govern whether the group has met the standard for being 
recognized as a “tribe.” I therefore occasionally substitute “indigenous peoples” for 
“tribe” in order to explain the BIA regulations more clearly. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 37,866. 
 284. See id. at 37,866-67. 
 285. The community requirement, political influence or authority requirement, and 
governing document requirement all reflect the community and political aspects of 
federal recognition. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(b)-(d). 
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to the people who were here first.286 To achieve status as a federally recognized 
tribe today through the acknowledgment process, it is therefore necessary for a 
tribe to make its case in part through the language of descent. 
While the regulations do not discuss the constitutional necessity of such a 
criterion, the BIA did address comments suggesting that the descent criterion 
should be eliminated “because it is race-based, while tribal membership is a 
political classification.”287 The BIA responded: 
The Department recognizes descent from a political entity (tribe or tribes) as a 
basis from which evaluations of identification, community, and political 
influence/authority under criteria (a), (b), and (c) may reveal continuation of that 
political entity. Evidence sufficient to satisfy (e) is utilized as an approximation of 
tribal membership before 1900.288 
To translate from bureaucratese, the BIA is saying that descent is another 
proxy for connections to a political entity, specifically a tribe, which existed 
historically. It is not a proxy for “race.” 
But this again begs the question: What is a tribe? Tribes, recognized in the 
Constitution as such, were the people here first. The BIA’s otherwise circular 
explanation makes sense if we add this reminder about the context and 
circumstances of our nation’s history. The notion of descent in this context is 
neither “race-based” nor a “proxy for race,” in Justice Kennedy’s formulation.289 
Instead, descent is a proxy for a people’s historical connection to place—a 
connection that, perhaps amazingly, has been recognized in American law 
since the Founding—despite American law’s frequent contradictory role of 
attempting to sever that very connection. 
3. International law definitions  
American Indian law was, at its inception, a creature of the law of na-
tions.290 As discussed above, early legal doctrine largely ratified the assertion of 
colonial and settler-nation authority over indigenous peoples, justifying the 
taking of Indian property and the unilateral assertion of political authority.291 
As Phillip Frickey has argued, international law also underwrote core 
foundational principles in American Indian law, including exclusive 
congressional power in Indian affairs.292 Since the rise of human rights in 
 
 286. See id. § 83.11(a)-(b), (e). 
 287. Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,867. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000); see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 290. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-26 (1996); supra 
note 244 and text accompanying notes 244-46. 
 291. See ANAYA, supra note 290, at 23-26. 
 292. See Frickey, supra note 24, at 55-56. 
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international law, however, indigenous peoples have pushed for international 
recognition of their rights to land, culture, and self-determination. According 
to Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley, “[i]nternational human rights law now 
serves as a basis for indigenous peoples’ claims against states and even 
influences indigenous groups’ internal processes of revitalization.”293 
Indigenous peoples have, in other words, pushed international law to become a 
means to recognize their rights rather than to undermine them.294 It is 
therefore instructive to look to definitions in international law of “indigenous 
peoples” to aid in the interpretation of “tribes” in U.S. law. Frickey made a 
similar argument concerning contemporary international law’s relevance to 
constitutional limitations on federal power: “emerging international law 
concerning the rights of indigenous peoples . . . provide[s] a domestic 
interpretive backdrop” for the interpretation of domestic law.295 The 
international definitions are not binding, but they connect Indian law’s origins 
with its present, providing the opportunity to redeem the racializing effects of 
the settler/colonial project.296  
At the outset, it is important to note that there is no universally accepted 
definition of indigenous peoples or indigenous identity under international 
law. According to Robert Williams, Jr., “[g]enerally, indigenous peoples have 
insisted on the right to define themselves.”297 Working definitions have 
nonetheless emerged from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
the United Nations. These definitions identify factors similar to those in U.S. 
law, including ties to people who preceded colonization. Similar to the 
definitions in the federal acknowledgment regulations, the international law 
definitions emphasize connections to history and place—as opposed to blood 
and race—appropriately rejecting the racializing and subordinating language of 
the colonial past. 
In 1989, the ILO adopted the Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 169).298 This 
 
 293. Carpenter & Riley, supra note 229, at 175. 
 294. See generally id. (arguing that recent developments in international indigenous human 
rights law have allowed indigenous peoples to reverse the effects of colonization and 
oppression). 
 295. Frickey, supra note 24, at 37. 
 296. Cf. id. at 74-78 (arguing that the international law origins of federal power in Indian 
affairs justify looking to international human rights norms today to inform the 
development of tribal rights in domestic law). 
 297. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: 
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 663 
n.4. 
 298. International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. 
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document, which has been ratified by twenty-two countries (not including the 
United States), is aimed at protecting and fostering indigenous culture, land, 
and resource rights as well as addressing discrimination.299 ILO Convention 
169 was a significant step in the development of international legal recognition 
of distinctive indigenous rights.300 Before its passage, indigenous peoples had to 
articulate their claims largely through the prism of individual human rights.301 
ILO Convention 169’s broader set of claims encompassed indigenous peoples’ 
group rights and therefore necessitated a description of the people to whom it 
applied. Thus, while ILO Convention 169 does not define “indigenous peoples,” 
it does include the following description: 
1. This Convention applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community . . . ; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region 
to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation . . . . 
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamen-
tal criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Conven-
tion apply.302 
The ILO’s description emphasizes ties to populations that inhabited the 
country precolonization, the presence of political and cultural institutions, and 
self-identification. And the ILO description, like the federal acknowledgment 
criteria, includes a criterion of descent from earlier indigenous populations.303 
In the United Nations context, the most important development has been 
the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007.304 The Declaration establishes and acknowledges 
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the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples around the world.305 UNDRIP 
was the culmination of many years of organizing by indigenous peoples and 
built on previous efforts (including the ILO’s) to write indigenous peoples into 
international legal instruments.306 While UNDRIP itself, like ILO Convention 
169, has no formal definition of indigenous peoples, the United Nations lists 
several factors that have their roots in earlier documents.307 The most 
significant of these documents is a report by José Martínez Cobo, who was 
appointed by the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities to conduct a study on the problem of discrimination 
against indigenous populations.308 In the report, Cobo provided the following 
working definition of “indigenous peoples”: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in 
those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of 
society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future genera-
tions their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems.309 
The Cobo study also mentions several ways that a community could be seen to 
have “historical continuity” with a precolonial society, including but not 
limited to whether the community occupies ancestral lands and whether the 
community shares a common culture or language with the precolonial 
society.310 Cobo’s working definition therefore shares essential elements with 
the U.S. common law and administrative definitions described above: ties to 
precontact peoples (descent) and status as a distinct people today (including 
evidence of political, legal, and cultural institutions). 
In short, the definitions that have emerged in the international indigenous 
rights era include elements of descent and ancestry, just as they do under U.S. 
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law. This makes sense given that the process of becoming “indigenous” is 
essentially a historical one. Before the arrival of others, indigenous peoples 
were simply the peoples of a given territory. To be indigenous is to have 
preceded colonization and settlement, necessitating historical continuity to 
peoples before that time. Descent, in this context, is a historical and normative 
description and not merely a substitute for “race.” 
 
*     *     * 
 
Early definitions of tribes in U.S. law were tainted by paternalism and 
assumptions of inferiority, yet they also contained a kernel of understanding 
that congressional power to recognize tribes could not exist in the absence of 
ties to peoples who preceded non-Indian colonization and settlement.311 The 
U.N. working definition shares key elements with the definitions of “tribe” that 
have evolved in U.S. law more recently—connections to precontact peoples, 
ties and attachment to ancestral lands, and distinct cultural and political 
structures—but the language is devoid of the racialized and demeaning aspects 
that pervaded early U.S. doctrine and have yet to be completely expunged.312 
The U.N. approach therefore points a way forward, providing terminolo-
gy that connects “indigenous peoples” to history and place without resorting to 
the language of “race” and “blood.” This difference is not just a matter of 
vocabulary; the racialized language of U.S. law inscribes a social and political 
hierarchy that, today, perpetuates a “common sense” of anti-Indian racism.313 If 
ties to ancestral peoples, the very criteria necessary to establish separate 
political existence as a tribe, are digested (by Supreme Court Justices, 
politicians, and the public alike) as “racial” ties as opposed to indicators of 
indigenous peoplehood, then the deck is instantly stacked against nonbiased 
ways of interpreting the meaning of any classification or distinctive treatment. 
The U.N. and ILO working definitions are more nuanced and also less succinct, 
but necessarily so; they describe not only historical and factual criteria but also 
factors rooted in intentions for the future—intentions to continue to exist as 
peoples who are connected to the past but not destined to remain there. For 
tribes to be recognized as such under our Constitution, the minimum criterion 
of descent from historical peoples should and can be interpreted similarly. 
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III. Being More Discriminate to Eliminate Discrimination 
The project of preserving tribes’ constitutional status while deconstructing 
the racialized definitions of tribes under U.S. law coheres with a larger body of 
work on the social construction of race. In their pathbreaking work on race 
and racism, Michael Omi and Howard Winant coined the term “racial 
formation.”314 They defined racial formation as “the sociohistorical process by 
which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”315 
Race, though a social construct and not a biological trait, acquires and produces 
meanings that structure aspects of our society and infuse everyday 
interactions.316 Racial formation theorists therefore “examine the ways in 
which race is constantly redefined, reworked, and rearticulated by social and 
political institutions in different political and historical periods.”317 Further, as 
Laura Gómez has described, “race itself is made meaningful by law, and law 
writ large is a reflection of racial-classification systems, racial ideology, and 
racial inequality.”318 Some critical race legal theorists have therefore focused on 
the “mutually constitutive” roles of law and race as they shape and reinforce 
one another.319 
Omi and Winant’s theory of race as a social construct also opened terrain 
to interrogate how different groups were racialized for different purposes.320 
In this vein, scholars of American Indian law and theorists of settler 
colonialism have analyzed the unique purposes served by the racialization of 
Native peoples.321 Native peoples were characterized as savage, uncivilized, 
and, like the animals that they hunted, ultimately doomed to extinction.322 No 
less a figure than George Washington, outlining the Indian policy of the 
Continental Congress, articulated this view: 
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[P]olicy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good 
terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference 
to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country; which as we 
have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest . . . ; when 
the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the 
Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape.323 
Alternatively, the troublesome racial aspects of individual Native Americans 
could be eradicated through forced assimilation; Indians, unlike African 
Americans, could become white through processes of civilization.324 The 
abovementioned quotation attributed to Richard Henry Pratt—“Kill the Indian, 
save the man”325—embodies this racialized view. 
These characterizations of Native people served the purpose of achieving 
their disappearance from the land, or in Patrick Wolfe’s influential 
terminology, they served the goal of indigenous “elimination.”326 Set-
tler/colonial societies—like the United States, Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand—had to wrest land and resources from indigenous populations, which 
they quickly outnumbered.327 The structure of race in American Indian law—
which either assumed or actively worked toward elimination of Native 
people—served to accomplish the objective of freeing up the land. 
Early definitions of tribes in U.S. law reflect the racialized conception of 
Indians. As discussed above, in United States v. Montoya328 and United States v. 
Sandoval,329 as well as many other cases, Indian cultural and political inferiority 
was integral to the conclusion that the entities were “tribes.”330 Further, 
whether an entity was a “tribe” and therefore entitled to protection by the 
United States sometimes hinged on whether that conclusion inhibited 
acquisition of land by non-Indians.331 Federal law and policy toward American 
Indians also reconstituted Native nations in various ways, forcing some 
distinct groups together and artificially separating others, thereby imposing 
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membership criteria on tribes that reflected the federal goals of controlling 
tribes’ existence and minimizing their disruptions to non-Indians.332 The rigid 
accounting measures imposed on tribes during the allotment era, including for 
many tribes the requirement that their members have certain quanta of Indian 
“blood,” represent another aspect of tribal racialization.333 
Despite eliminationist strategies and constructions of the disappearing 
Indian that they inscribed, tribes are still here. Tribal governments are 
working to overcome the historic traumas of land loss, cultural devastation, 
and familial disruption through tribal political, legal, and economic 
revitalization efforts.334 Federal laws, including ICWA and IGRA, recognize 
tribes as governments and provide the means for tribes to restore their cultures 
and their economies. Like all laws, they are not perfect. And like all human 
situations to which laws apply, there are examples of how these laws may 
result in difficult outcomes or cause unfairness. 
But the equal protection attacks on ICWA and on tribal gaming laws aim 
to do far more than tinker at the margins. They aim to recruit federal courts to 
strike down these statutes on the ground that tribes are nothing other than 
racial groups. This is today’s formulation of the eliminationist structure of 
racism against Native peoples. Rather than see tribes as governments, the cases 
describe tribal membership as nothing other than blood ties. The refrain in 
Adoptive Couple went further; not only was it a blood tie, it was a very scant one. 
(“It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological 
Father would have had no right to object to her adoption . . . .”)335 This repeats 
the eliminationist logic of allotment and termination: insufficient “blood” 
means you cannot really be Indian. And it also resonates with the “common 
sense” of racism in the context of Indian gaming. As Renee Ann Cramer has 
described, tribes who have gained economic success through gaming are 
accused of not truly being Indian; racist tropes, including that Indians should 
look like “full-bloods” and should not participate in the modern economy, 
pervade objections to gaming and creep into other areas of law as well.336 
It would therefore be worse than ironic for federal courts to deploy equal 
protection analysis to overthrow statutes like ICWA and tribal gaming laws; it 
would be tragic because it would reenact the very policies of elimination that 
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those laws were passed to redress. Furthermore, employing such an analysis is 
easily avoided on multiple grounds. First, federal courts can and should hew to 
precedent and uphold Mancari.337 Second, courts that are unconvinced by 
precedent alone due to Mancari’s insufficient articulation of its rationale can 
rely on the deeper explanations for tribes’ political status.338 Third, as argued 
here, tribes—recognized in our Constitution and accorded distinct status by 
that document, its structure, and its history—are necessarily defined as the 
peoples who preceded us on the continent. Shorn of the racialized descriptions 
that were attached to the definition of tribes for too long, the criterion of 
connection to precolonial peoples remains. Today’s federal acknowledgment 
criteria recognize and require this relationship, and working definitions in 
international law include such ties as well.339 Those ties, whether expressed 
today in terms of lineal descent, ancestry, or otherwise, should not be used 
against tribes or Indian people in a misguided pursuit of constitutional 
colorblindness. 
This Article advances an exceptionalist position for resisting colorblind 
constitutionalism and the opposition to affirmative action in American Indian 
law. But it is consistent with racial formation theory’s call for contextualized 
analysis of the working and reworking of racial concepts in law. Race and 
racism have done different work in the American Indian context than in the 
context of African Americans, Latinos, Hispanics, and Asians. In particular, 
racialized constructs are associated with legal definitions of tribes and tribal 
members in ways that reinforce the very stereotypes that pose obstacles to 
tribal survival today. The theoretical approach embraced in this Article can 
and should yield very different analyses for other groups, and in this way the 
project advances the larger goal of urging multiple exceptionalisms to redress 
the different inequalities produced by racism in this country. 
Moreover, the argument here supports rejecting colorblind constitutional-
ism generally. Race, as racial formation theory posits, is not just a formal 
category that can be detected and routed from the law. It is a shifting social and 
political construct, and its capacity to perpetuate inequality evades efforts to 
locate it through formal categories alone.340 Paying attention to race and its 
formations is more likely to someday yield a racially equal society than the 
 
 337. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also supra Part I (discussing Mancari). 
 338. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 153-55 (describing the historical origins of tribes’ political 
status); Krakoff, supra note 14, at 1048-51.  
 339. See supra Part II.B.2-3. 
 340. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 31, at 1-2; Gómez, supra note 31, at 1397; Rich, supra note 
317, at 1354-55; Gómez, supra note 318, at 231. 
They Were Here First 
69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017) 
547 
strategy of equating all uses of race—including those that combat historical 
subordination—with discrimination “on the basis of race.”341 
Conclusion 
The history of European/American settlement and the formation of the 
republic leave no doubt that the words “Indian tribes” refer to the peoples who 
occupied the continent before non-Indian settlement. The federal govern-
ment’s power to recognize Native peoples as governments within the United 
States rests on the constitutional distinction between “tribes”—self-governing 
societies with ties to precontact peoples—and other groups. A constitutional 
minimum for tribal political recognition, in other words, is connection to the 
people who preceded European/American arrival. That connection is not 
“racial,” so long as we understand race to be a sociolegal construct that assigns 
characteristics to certain groups for the purpose of unjustified subordination 
(or, in the case of whiteness, the assertion of unjustified privilege).342 Though 
legal definitions of “tribe” were freighted with discriminatory meanings for 
centuries, today domestic and international legal criteria defining tribal status 
focus instead on historical ties to land as well as continuity of politics, culture, 
and self-understanding. International law’s embrace of the rights of indigenous 
peoples can and should inform definitions of tribes under U.S. law, linking 
Indian law to its internationalist past while shedding the taint of colonialism. 
Attempts to enshrine unyielding colorblind or race-neutral understand-
ings of the Equal Protection Clause threaten, perversely, to characterize tribes 
once again as groups defined primarily by “race.” Such attempts undermine 
laws and policies that protect tribes as governments. At the same time, they 
deploy misunderstandings and stereotypes about Native people to gain 
traction. In the adoption and child welfare context, Indian tribal status is 
depicted as nothing more than a blood tie that keeps children from being 
placed in better circumstances. Tribal connections are implicitly challenged as 
not being “real,” and Native parents are seen as using their racial status to get a 
leg up in custody battles. In the gaming context, there is a similar dynamic. 
Tribes, instead of being categorized as governments engaged in economic 
development, are depicted as “quasi-racial” groups unfairly competing in the 
marketplace. 
To avoid reinscribing this racially discriminatory understanding of tribes 
and Indian people, courts need only exercise restraint. They do not have to 
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create new categories of protected classes for equal protection analysis. They do 
not have to second-guess the legislative branch. Instead, all courts have to do is 
hew to precedent, deferring to Congress when it enacts legislation that 
furthers its unique relationship with American Indian tribes—the peoples who 
were here first. 
